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 The majority of a school system’s budget is spent on personnel.  In order to use 
this tremendous amount of money efficiently it is important educators understand the 
impact different spending priorities, specifically total per-pupil expenditures, teacher 
salary, principal salary, pupil/teacher ratio, and pupil/support personnel ratio have on 
student achievement and how these inputs are moderated by a district’s population 
density and wealth.  Spending data from all the school divisions in Virginia were 
examined using public spending data from the Virginia Department of Education, and 
population density and wealth statistics from the Office of Budget Management, US 
Census Bureau, and Commonwealth of Virginia Commission on Local Government.  
Bivariate correlations and linear regression slopes were examined to determine the 
impact of the main effects and multiple linear regression model building was used to 
examine how a district’s wealth and population density moderate the effects of per-pupil 
expenditures, teacher salary, principal salary, pupil/teacher ratio and pupil/support 
personnel ratio.  Teacher salary proved significant for both math and reading scores while 
principal salary was significant for math scores only.  None of the other main effects had 
a significant impact on student achievement.   A division’s status as “rural” by itself 
proved to be correlated with both reading and math scores.  Additionally, wealth by itself 
was a statistically and practically significant predictor of student achievement regardless 
of the measurement used highlighting the problems posed for education by economic 
inequality.  When wealth was measured using either median household income or fiscal 
stress the correlation with student achievement was twice that of composite index 
indicating composite index may not be the best wealth measurement for the state to use to 
vi 
 
allocate funding in order to level the playing field.  Further research is needed to 
determine how spending effects overall school climate, how the adverse impact of wealth 
can be overcome, and if making changes to the wealth measurement used will help to 























K-12 education in the United States is very expensive, costing $620 billion per 
year (National Center for Education Statistics, 2016).  This large price tag is for an 
industry that does not produce any tangible product (unlike manufacturing), and yet 
without it, other industries would be unable to function as they would lack the necessary 
skilled workers.  While education is very expensive, it is a product most people are 
willing to purchase to ensure an educated population.  Since money is not unlimited, it 
must be spent smartly.  Education, unlike manufacturing, does not consume large 
quantities of natural resources or energy, it is essentially a service provider and people 
are by far the largest expense.  In fact, 80% of the money spent to educate students is 
spent on salaries and benefits (National Center for Education Statistics, 2016).  Given the 
large price tag associated with personnel, it is important to understand and strategically 
plan how to spend money on people in order to maximize the student achievement return 
on the personnel investment.   
The ability to prioritize spending to best meet the needs of your school is an 
important leadership function.  Both the theory of transformational leadership (Bass, 
1985; Burns, 1978) and the Interstate School Leader’s Licensure Consortium (National 
Policy Board for Education Administration, 2008) have the development and 
implementation of a vision as cornerstones.  According to Kaplan and Norton (1993), 
considering the financial perspective is a key component of implementing a vision.  In 
describing how to focus your organization with a Balanced Scorecard, they list as a 
critical step ensuring budgeting meets strategic goals (p. 36) and eliminating investments 
that do not contribute to the vision (p. 42).  With personnel spending as K-12 education’s




largest single expense, it is an imperative leadership task to examine it to ensure spending 
supports the overall vision. 
In education people are both the input and the output.   Educated people are the 
product or output, and to create that output, a large number of caring, trained teachers and 
others are needed to perform the labor intensive task of working with and encouraging 
students to maximize their potential.  The largest expense in almost any school system’s 
budget is people, half of whom are teachers. A good superintendent will pay close 
attention to personnel as it is the largest, most variable portion of the budget and the one 
that presents the most opportunities for success (Absheir, Harris & Hopson, 2011, p. 8).  
People are the one indispensable resource in education and a school division that has the 
right mix of people can maximize their impact on student achievement within the 
financial constraints of their budget. As education is a people business, a significant part 
of improving education should be determining how to smartly spend the limited money to 
get the optimal mix of people to maximize student success.  One way to determine how 
to do this is to study the relationship between spending and student achievement scores.  
Specifically, this study examines exactly how and under what conditions increased 
spending on personnel yields practically significant results as this differs based on the 
unique situation of each district. 
The basic framework asserting that spending inputs relate to educational outputs 
(achievement) is what is known as an “education production function” (Hanushek, 1986).  
Hanushek (1986) characterizes these as non-experimental, econometric studies that 
examine each of the inputs effecting student achievement (p. 1148).  By following this 
basic framework, a researcher can examine relationships between spending decisions or 




inputs and the outputs we refer to as student achievement.  This type of research can help 
the education practitioner to make staffing decisions to ensure the best mix of employees 
for maximizing student success. 
Making the best staffing decisions requires school divisions to understand the 
specific role each type of employee plays in attaining the desired student achievement 
results.  For example, the teacher undoubtedly has the most direct impact on student 
success as it is he or she who directly provides instruction to the students.  In order to 
maximize teacher impact, a school division must decide if it makes more sense to have 
more teachers in order to reduce class size, or if it makes more sense to offer a higher 
salary to minimize turn-over, improve morale, and recruit and retain the “best and 
brightest” teachers.  While teachers are undeniably the most important employees with 
the most potential to improve student achievement, they are not the only ones who play 
an important role in student achievement.  Principals provide the school with leadership 
while instructional aides and other support personnel perform countless other valuable 
tasks that make schools run smoothly and ensure most of a teacher’s time can be spent on 
instruction.  By having the best possible mix of employees a division should be able to 
obtain the best possible student achievement. 
Teachers make up half of the employees in a typical school division and cost a 
total of $175 billion annually (National Center for Education Statistics, 2016).  Divisions 
can increase or decrease the amount of money they spend on teacher salaries in two 
different ways.  First, by adjusting the quantity of teachers hired.  The more teachers a 
division employs, the more money they must spend.  Adjusting this amount, called “pupil 
or student/teacher ratio,” has obvious instructional implications and most, but not all, 




studies in this area (Jepson & Rivkin, 2009; Krueger 2003; Glass & Smith 1979; 
Figlio1998) suggest a positive relationship between student/teacher ratio and student 
achievement. 
Second, a division could adjust the amount of money it spends on teachers by 
adjusting the amount spent on each teacher’s salary and benefits.  Spending more money 
on each teacher could theoretically improve morale and allow a specific division to 
recruit better teachers.  Several studies (James, 2011; Figlio, 1998; Macphail-Wilcox & 
King, 1986) found increasing salaries has a positive impact on student achievement.  
However, the possible trade-off is the more divisions spend per teacher, the fewer 
teachers they can afford to employ.  Likewise, if a division spends money on small class 
sizes (lots of teachers) this means there is less to spend on each teacher which may 
impact quality.  It is currently unknown which option is better due to an absence of 
studies specifically examining both simultaneously.   
In a school building the principal is the undisputed leader.  It is the principal who 
is ultimately responsible for everything that happens in the school.  Research on the 
impact of the principal on student achievement shows principals impact student 
achievement by selecting teachers, providing a focus or vision, and by direct control of 
curriculum and instructional practices (Brewer, 1992).  Principal salary has been shown 
to be important for getting people to become principals (Norton, 2003) and in improving 
academic achievement (Brewer, 1992).    
While the principal provides valuable leadership, schools also employ support 
personnel who work behind the scenes to keep everything going smoothly.  Support 
personnel include custodians, bus drivers, food service workers, receptionists, and 




secretaries and instructional aides.  These are individuals without a Department of 
Education License, often referred to as “para-professionals,” who make the duties of 
teachers and administrators much easier.  These are the individuals who either help the 
school function smoothly and efficiently or who lighten the burden on teachers, 
theoretically making their job easier.  They typically cost a school system one-half of 
what a teacher costs and so theoretically could be a cost effective way to get things done.  
Logic dictates hiring more of these employees should improve your school and this is 
common thinking as 12% of K-12 staff fall into the instructional aide category (National 
Center for Education Statistics, 2015).  However, very little research has been conducted 
to support the link between support personnel and student achievement. This lack of 
research makes it unknown if hiring more instructional aides and other support personnel 
makes sense. 
Understanding the overall link between spending on class size, teacher salary, 
principal salary and support personnel is important, but to truly understand the 
relationship between spending inputs and achievement one must consider the possibility 
the relationship may vary depending on the unique characteristics of a school district.  
For example, a division’s status as rural, suburban, or urban has been shown to impact a 
district’s ability to recruit and retain teachers (Greenlee & Brown, 2009; Guarino, 
Santibanez & Daley, 2006).  So, it is important to examine how a division’s population 
density moderates the effect of spending inputs on student achievement outputs.  
Likewise, the wealth of a school district impacts recruiting, retention, and the need for 
sound leadership in school settings (Greenlee & Brown, 2009; Charlotte Advocates for 
Education, 2004; O’Donnell & White, 2003; Payne 2003, 2009).  Understanding how the 




effects of spending inputs on achievement are moderated by wealth and population 
density is crucial to making the best decisions for each unique school division. 
This study explores the relationship between teacher salary, principal salary, 
student-teacher ratio, and student/support personnel ratio compared to student 
achievement as measured by reading and math Standards of Learning test scores (SOLs).  
Examining all of these main effects simultaneously contributes to answering the overall 
question of which of these inputs is most important in influencing student achievement?  
In addition to examining the main effects of each of these categories, this study explores 
how each of these main effects is moderated by a district’s wealth and population density.  
By better understanding this relationship, education practitioners will be able to make the 
best possible staffing decisions for their specific districts. 
Literature Review 
Introduction 
In conducting this study, I examine the nature of the relationship between the 
inputs of average individual teacher salary, pupil/teacher ratio, principal salary, per pupil 
expenditures, pupil/support personnel ratio, and the outputs of student achievement in 
reading and math as measured by the Virginia Standards of Learning (SOL) tests.  In 
examining these relationships, I  establish which of these inputs has a positive impact 
student achievement.  Then I examine whether or not and how spending inputs impact on 
student achievement changes based on a division’s wealth and population density 
(rural/suburban/urban) composition.  In this literature review I discuss relevant literature 
on each of these main effects and then on the variables that may serve as moderating 
effects.  The following literature review summarizes prior research on the impact of per 




pupil expenditures, teacher salary, principal salary, and pupil/teacher ratio on student 
achievement and will provide a rationale for how these effects may be moderated by a 
district’s wealth and population density. 
Main Effects 
Spending.  Much of the literature on effectiveness of school system spending 
seeks to evaluate effectiveness on the basis of “education production function.”   An 
education production function is a formula where the output of student achievement is 
related to resources or inputs (Macphail-Wilcox & King, 1986, p. 196).   Some inputs are 
things a school can control, such as teachers, facilities, and curriculum.  Other inputs 
consist of environmental factors such as a student’s ability, level of family support, or 
SES and are difficult to control (Hanushek, 1986, p. 1150).   So, the education production 
function is simply a formula to determine what inputs (resources) can provide the desired 
outputs (student achievement) (Macphail-Wilcox & King, 1986, p. 196).    
The concept of the production function originated in business.  However, while in 
business the customer determines the value of a product, in education the student is both 
the product and the customer (James, 2015, p. 44).  This deprives education of the built-
in judge businesses enjoy for product quality.  Students lack the product knowledge of 
consumers and while there are private schools, parents lack the same degree of choice as 
customers searching for traditional products.  In present day education, quality is most 
often determined by test scores.  Test scores are used by teachers to evaluate student 
success, by principals to determine teacher quality, and by the community to judge their 
local schools.  Consequently, test scores are the most convenient output measure for 
student achievement as the market forces of business do not apply. 




 Ideally, and as noted by Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald (1994) a production 
function could be used to predict how spending will impact student learning as measured 
by test scores and may allow the researcher to identify the most cost-effective ways of 
running a school division (p. 5).   So, a production function allows education decision 
makers to have some idea what effect their spending decisions (as they select which 
inputs are important) will have on the output (student achievement). It is this basic 
premise that researchers use to equate school factors with student achievement. 
For the last fifty years, researchers have attempted to link spending inputs with 
student achievement to determine what, if any impact spending has.  Researchers linking 
school outcomes with spending began in 1966 when congress commissioned the writing 
of Equality of Educational Opportunity, commonly known as The Coleman Report 
(Coleman, 1966).   Coleman (1966), examined the status of America’s schools with 
regards to educational quality, and determined the quality of the school does not make 
much difference in student achievement (p. 22).  Coleman’s findings asserted most (70%) 
of student achievement variation is found within the population of a particular school (p. 
296) indicating the majority of student achievement is influenced less by schools than by 
other factors.  In fact, he concluded only 10 to 20% of variation can be attributed to 
schools leading him to conclude school factors are not particularly important (p. 22).   If 
Coleman’s work were accepted, there would be little point in striving to improve our 
schools.  Many researchers have since taken issue with Coleman’s (1966) findings and 
common sense suggests how a school spends should have a positive effect on student 
achievement.   




Although within school variation accounts for the majority of variance in student 
achievement scores, the 10-20% of variance associated with schools may not be trivial.  
According to Marzano (2001), even a 10% difference in variance is still meaningful as it 
will result in a typical student scoring 23% higher at the best school than at the worst 
school (p. 2).  Consequently, Coleman’s findings can be interpreted differently, that 
differences between schools are important and do have a meaningful impact on student’s 
lives.   
If we assume school quality matters, it raises the question as to what specific 
school spending characteristics are most important.  The evidence suggests simply 
spending alone does not have an impact on student achievement but that spending 
intelligently might.  Hanushek (1986) conducted a meta-analysis of 147 spending studies 
and concluded that spending alone is not directly related to a student’s performance (pp. 
1159-1167).  More recent studies also support Hanushek’s findings.  For example, a 
study comparing spending amongst EU countries found some countries spend a lot of 
money and get student achievement scores lower than those countries spending much less 
money (Agasisti, 2014).  In addition, Schanchter (2010) compared per pupil spending 
across the country and found that while in New York it costs an average of $17,173 per 
year to educate a student, Utah is able to educate a student for just $5,765 (p. 40).  Utah 
does this with large class sizes, limited technology, few administrators and few 
instructional specialists (p. 42).  Despite spending considerably less, Utah’s schools 
perform better as measured by their major city graduation rates ranging between 85% and 
92% compared with New York’s rates of 48% to 56% (p. 51). This indicates good results 
can perhaps be achieved without spending a lot of money.  However, the culture, wealth 




and demographics of New York versus Utah are substantially different and probably play 
a role in the need to spend money to get results.  Additionally, as each state develops 
their own curriculum and graduation requirements, comparing New York to Utah is not 
an even comparison.   
 In order to determine how well individual U.S. school districts do with efficiency, 
Boser (2014) conducted a study of 2,397 school districts that controlled for student 
environmental factors and found only 37% of the districts in the top one-third for 
spending also overlapped with the top one-third for achievement (p. 25).  This would 
seem to indicate a weak or no link between spending and student achievement and 
therefore support the idea that spending by itself does not guarantee results, meaning 
districts must spend intelligently in addition to spending large amounts.   While there is a 
large body of research refuting a link between spending and instruction, not all 
researchers are in agreement in this area.  While Hanushek’s (1986) research pointed to 
the need to spend smartly instead of just more, some researchers disagree with this 
conclusion on spending.  Hedges et al. (1994) re-examined the same data used by 
Hanushek (1986) but with a different statistical method, magnitude analysis and 
combined significance testing instead of vote counting, and came to the opposite 
conclusion finding a positive correlation between resources and student achievement.  
However, Hanushek (1994) has called these findings into question noting Hedges et al. 
(1994) eliminated studies that did not find significance and did not note a direction for 
their insignificant findings.  Given the existing evidence, I predict the large, diverse 
sample of districts across an entire state to yield similar results to those found by Agasisti 




(2014), Boser (2014), and Schanchter (2010).  Consequently, I do not predict spending to 
have an impact on student achievement. 
H1:  There is no relationship between per-pupil spending and student achievement 
as measured by reading and math SOL scores. 
Teacher salary.  If schools are able to impact the student in any way, it is through 
the work of the teacher as it is the teacher who has by far the most direct contact with the 
students.  The ability of a teacher has been shown to have a consistent impact on student 
achievement.  Students with the most effective teachers have been shown to improve 
while even talented students with ineffective teachers will struggle to improve (Wright, 
Horn & Saunders, 1997, p. 63).  In fact, Wright et al. (1997) examined 13 factors thought 
to influence student achievement and found teacher quality to have the largest effect size 
of any of these factors.  Rockoff (2004) also found teacher quality to have a significant, 
but smaller positive impact on student achievement and found the most experienced 
teachers often performed the best (p. 247).  This indicates high quality teachers do make 
a difference.  If a division is fortunate enough to employ all high quality teachers, they 
will get better student achievement scores than districts with low quality teachers.  
Likewise, if a district is only able to employ ineffective teachers, they will post less 
favorable results.   
 Just like in a business transaction, the hiring and salaries of teachers can be 
conceptualized as a supply/demand transaction (Guarino, et al. 2006, p. 174).  They 
explain demand as the number of teaching positions that need to be filled and supply as 
the number of qualified teachers who will work for the offered compensation.  




Consequently, the way to increase a division’s supply is to increase the offered 
compensation until the supply increases and balances with the demand. 
 Schools compete with one-another to attract and retain the best teachers.  Often 
teachers start their career at whatever school has an opening before moving to a school 
they truly view as favorable for a myriad of reasons, one of which is salary.  Ingersoll 
(2001) found 47% of teachers who left one school for another cited salary as a reason.  
This indicates a teacher may start their career wherever they can find a position.  As they 
gain experience, they are no longer willing to work for what they see as an inadequate 
salary and seek higher wages in another district.  Supporting this notion is the finding of 
Allen (2005) who reviewed 28 studies on teacher salary and found increasing salaries has 
a positive impact on retention (p. 92).   
 School divisions that offer the highest salaries can attract teachers from the best 
colleges and universities.  Figlio (2002) built on the link between teacher quality and 
strength of a teacher’s undergraduate institution (Ehrenburg & Brewer, 1994) by using a 
teacher’s undergraduate institution as a proxy for teacher quality and found a statistically 
significant positive relationship between higher salaries and a district’s ability to attract 
quality teachers (Figlio, 2002, p. 697).  This indicates students from the best colleges 
have the luxury of seeking the school districts with the best salaries as they have more 
options compared to students from schools with lesser reputations.  Lankford, Loeb and 
Wycoff (2002) in a study using NY State personnel data, found teachers who were more 
qualified, as determined by the selectivity of their college and their success on the state 
teaching exams, were more likely to switch schools or school districts than less qualified 




teachers.  This suggests if a district fails to have a sufficiently attractive salary scale, they 
risk losing their best teachers, who have more options to move to other districts.  
 Research clearly indicates there is a need to offer competitive salaries in order to 
compete for teachers with other districts.  An extension of this logic is the idea that 
districts with the best compensation will be able to attract the best teachers and will 
therefore have the highest test scores.  For example, Houck, Rolle and He (2010), studied 
the efficiency of school districts in Georgia and determined greater productivity to be 
correlated with higher teacher salaries (p. 352).  Additionally, Macphail-Wilcox and King 
(1986), in a meta-analysis, found salary is correlated with student performance and 
suggest this is because higher salaries allow districts to attract teachers with higher verbal 
abilities which have been shown to indicate teacher quality (p. 207).  In a more direct link 
to student achievement, Figlio (1998) found if starting teacher salaries are raised by 10% 
one can expect a 1.3% increase in 10th grade student achievement scores (p. 247).  James 
(2011) came to a similar conclusion finding the total cost spent on teachers to be the only 
measurable input to have an impact on student achievement (p. 7).  Together, this 
evidence suggests that divisions that pay better can also attract better teachers, building 
the case for raising teachers’ salaries. 
Not all researchers found a positive relationship between teacher salary and 
achievement.  Galchus (1994) found as overall salaries went up, teacher quality went 
down. He hypothesized this was because administrators, to keep their overall teacher 
costs low, are selecting cheaper employees at the bottom of the pay scale.  For this 
reason, it is important for a researcher to look at average salary paid by a division rather 




than just looking at select points on the division’s salary scale as was done by Galchus 
(1994). 
The research makes it clear a competitive salary is necessary for a division to 
recruit and retain the best quality teachers.  School divisions compete for the best 
employees with each other and with the greater job market.  School districts who fail to 
offer a competitive salary will be left behind by better paying districts.  Consequently, I 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between teacher salary and student 
achievement as measured by a school division’s reading and math SOL scores. 
Principal salary.  Principals are ultimately responsible for everything that 
happens at their school.  When a school performs poorly, principals are often replaced.  
According to the Interstate School Leadership Licensure Consortium, Principals are 
charged with facilitating a shared vision, ensuring student learning, safe and effective 
school management, and collaborating with the community (National Policy Board for 
Education Administration, 2008).  Because of these large responsibilities, principals are 
typically given a larger salary than teachers.  There is a large range of principal salaries, 
and compared to research on teacher salaries, little research has been done to link them 
with student achievement.  However, existing literature does seem to indicate principal 
quality has an impact on student achievement. 
Principals can influence student achievement by creating a school culture focused 
on tailoring professional development, evaluations, and faculty meetings towards 
addressing issues relating to student achievement.  Additionally, the policies set by 
principals can influence the practice of teachers and therefore student achievement 




(Dhuey & Smith, 2014, p. 638).  Evidence that the principal matters can be found by 
studying the changes that occur when a principal leaves his or her post and is replaced by 
a new principal.  Miller (2011) found principals matter when it comes to student 
achievement as was evidenced by a downturn in student academic performance when 
there is a transition between principals (p. 71).  This does not directly indicate a 
difference between the best and worst principals, but does show the principal has an 
impact on student achievement.   
Principals impact student achievement through the method and quality of 
leadership they provide to schools.  Shatzer, Caldarella, Hallam and Brown (2013) 
conducted a study of principal leadership styles at 37 elementary schools and determined 
those who display “Instructional” leadership styles have a larger impact on student 
achievement than those who displayed a transformational style (p. 10).  This indicates the 
principal’s leadership traits/style do matter to students and teachers.  The impact 
principals have has also been measured by following the most effective principals as they 
move from school to school.  Dhuey and Smith (2014) examined the relationship between 
schools and principals in British Columbia. They identified effective and ineffective 
principals as they transferred from one school to another and observed the impact they 
had at their new school.  They also found principals can influence test scores in both 
reading and math (p. 661).  They found an improvement in principal quality of one 
standard deviation results in an increase of 0.29 standard deviations in math and 0.41 in 
reading (p. 661).  In addition to impacting test scores, the best principals hire the best 
teachers through their knowledge of the hiring process and have the greatest impact on 
discipline and attendance (Rice, 2010).  This indicates a principal can have a meaningful 




impact on student achievement.  Experienced principals usually cost more money as 
salary scales demand more experienced administrators make more money than novice 
administrators.  Consequently, experience matters and a division will likely have to pay 
for it. 
As high salaries are often needed to draw the best administrators, low salaries in a 
division can prevent teachers from aspiring to become administrators.  While 
administrators usually make more money than teachers, this extra money is often offset 
by the extra hours they must work minimizing the financial gain (Norton, 2003, p. 52).  
However, the financial gain is important when a division is seeking quality principals and 
their salaries can have an impact on student achievement.  Brewer (1992) noted principals 
are especially important because they have power over teacher selection, can provide a 
school-wide focus, and can exert control over curriculum.  Brewer (1992) examined 
longitudinal data collected from a sample of students at 1,100 different high schools and 
concluded if one raises a principal’s salary compared to that of a teacher by just 5%, it 
will result in a 20% gain in student achievement scores (p. 288).  This would seem to 
indicate raising principal salary is an effective way to improve student achievement.  
While less conclusive, Menshah, Schoderbek and Sahay (2013), in a statewide study of 
administrator salaries across the state of New Jersey, did not find a statistically significant 
relationship between administrative salaries and student test scores.  However, they did 
find a weak positive relationship when using a dynamic panel estimator with Gaussian 
Mixture Modeling (p. 15). They describe their results as “ambiguous” and do not base 
any conclusions on their findings.  Given the strong research rationale for a principal’s 
leadership role being important and given all of the empirical studies are either positive 




or at worst inconclusive, I expect to find a positive relationship between principal salary 
and student achievement.  Consequently, I put forth the following hypotheses: 
H3: Principal salary is significantly related to student achievement as measured by 
a school division’s reading and math SOL scores. 
 Class size.  Class size is one of the largest drivers of the cost of education, and a 
small increase or decrease can have a large budgetary impact.  Koshal and Manjulika 
(1998) found in higher education that a one student increase in class size nationally 
would translate into over $1 million in savings at public colleges and over $2 million at 
private colleges (p. 276).  This demonstrates the financial gain that can be achieved by 
increasing class size.  But, what is the gain for student achievement by reducing class 
size? 
Class size is often used to indicate school quality because it is indicative of the 
amount of personal attention each student receives (Miles, 2011, p. l 45).  The thought 
being, smaller classes lead to more individual attention and therefore better learning.   
However, the consensus on small class sizes equaling school quality is far from 
unanimous.  In fact, class size was one of the factors Coleman (1966) found did not 
impact student achievement.  Hanushek (1986), in a meta-analysis of studies on class size 
examined 112 estimates and found only nine showed small classes improved student 
achievement while fourteen showed a negative effect on student achievement (p. 1161).  
Krueger (2003) reexamined Hanushek’s data and found if Hanushek had given all studies 
equal weight instead of the individual estimates within the studies there would be an 
overall positive relationship between smaller classes and student achievement (p. F60).   
In a meta-analysis of 300 studies, Glass and Smith (1979) found a strong relationship 




between class size and student achievement regardless of subjects or student ability.  
They did find the relationship was the strongest at the upper grades, but that it existed at 
all levels of K-12 education (p. 15).  A meta-analysis conducted by Shin and Chung 
(2009) noted the state of confusion surrounding class size literature and attempted to sort 
it out by examining 17 recent studies on class size reduction.  They concluded small 
classes perform better than large classes by 0.20 standard deviations (p.15).  Similar 
results were found by Wenglinsky (1997) who analyzed National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) data and found smaller class sizes do have an impact on 
student achievement (p. 233).   
 Additionally, large scale studies have consistently shown a positive relationship 
between class size and student achievement.  In the 1990’s California instituted a reform 
to change the average class size of a K-3 class from 30 students to 20 students (Jepson & 
Rivkin, 2009, p. 247).  The results of this program showed reducing class size to be 
effective for all segments of the population (p. 247).  Additionally, Figlio (1998) found in 
a study of 10th graders increasing the ratio of students to teachers by 10% results in an 
average 1.4% drop in student achievement (p. 147). 
 Tennessee, like California, conducted a large-scale study on class size reduction.  
This study, known as Student Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR) examined 330 
Tennessee K-3 classrooms.  Groups consisted of one control and two treatment groups.  
The treatment group consisted of a group with small classes and a group with classes the 
same size as the control groups but with an aide in addition to the teacher.  The study 
found significant gains with Cohen’s d effect sizes from .13 to .27 for the group with the 
smaller classes (Mosteller, 1995).  Hanushek (1999) challenged these results asserting 




many students switched between the control and treatment groups throughout the study 
(p. 153). 
 While the evidence is far from forming a consensus, most studies and those 
conducted on the largest scale, indicate smaller classes do have a positive effect on 
student achievement.  Additionally, logic dictates the more attention a teacher can 
provide to each individual student, the greater the gains.  However, the need to hire more 
teachers to reduce class size could be detrimental as it can cause divisions to forgo 
quality and hire less qualified teachers to meet their staffing goals (Miles, 2011, p. 45). 
Still, the bulk of the evidence indicates smaller classes have a positive impact on student 
achievement and consequently, I propose the following hypothesis. 
H4: The ratio of teachers to students is positively related to student achievement 
as measured by a division’s reading and math SOL scores. 
 Support personnel.  School divisions employ a lot of K-12 personnel in support 
roles.  These are employees who lack a professional license from the Department of 
Education and are often referred to as “para-professionals.”  Para-professionals make up 
12% of the total number of K-12 employees (National Center for Education Statistics, 
2015).  Despite the large number of employees in this category, very little research has 
been done to establish their effectiveness on academic achievement.  In fact, only two 
studies dealing with this topic could be found using Google Scholar.  The first, studying 
just instructional aides concluded instructional aides did not have a significant impact on 
student achievement (except in the area of K-2 reading) (Gerber, Finn, Achilles & 
Zaharias, 2001).  They examined whether being in a classroom with a teacher’s aide had 
an effect on student achievement by comparing students in classes with an aide for one, 




two, three, or four years.  They found a small significant effect on 2nd and 3rd grade years 
for students who had only been in a class with an instructional aid for one or two years 
(p. 133).  However, they did not account for the fact that in a lot of schools it is common 
practice to place the students with the most profound needs in classes with aides as an 
aide is often used to assist students with learning or behavioral disabilities.  This means 
the classes with an aide are often the classes with the greatest challenges to teaching and 
learning to begin with and so their results are questionable.   Additionally, they did not 
take into account the overall effect of having a higher density of support personnel in 
general has on the entire school division.  
In addition to the single study directly on instructional aides, there was an 
experimental study primarily on class size reduction, the Tennessee STAR Project 
(Mosteller, 1995), which added the inclusion of an instructional aide as an extra variable 
and found a small Cohen’s d effect sizes between .05-.14 depending on which assessment 
was administered.  These results are questionable because a considerable number of 
students transferred between the control and treatment groups throughout the study 
(Hanushek, 1999, p. 154).  Consequently, there is simply not enough evidence to 
conclude adding support personnel is or is not beneficial for student achievement. 
 While there may be an absence of evidence on the effectiveness of support 
personnel, most school divisions employ them.  According to Gerber, Finn, Achilles, and 
Boyd-Zharia, (2001), the employment of support personnel is based on “common sense” 
(p. 124). While their role in education is greatly varied, instructional aides are used 
primarily to reduce “administrative burdens” on teachers and to perform instructional 
tasks under the supervision of the teacher (p. 124). 




  School divisions employ other support personnel, such as secretaries and nurses, 
to help ensure the school runs smoothly.  If support staffs are overwhelmed, it will hurt 
the efficiency of the division as those duties will either go undone or will need to be done 
by professional staff at a greater expense due to their higher salaries.  Despite this line of 
logic, there is no research establishing a higher number of support personnel per pupil has 
any impact on student achievement.  This leads me to propose the following hypothesis 
on the impact of support personnel on student achievement: 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the ratio of support personnel and 
student achievement as measured by a division’s performance on reading and math SOL 
scores.   
 Largest impact.  If all of the main effects discussed above positively affect 
student achievement this information will still be of limited use to division 
superintendents as their limited budgets will not allow a meaningful increase in spending 
in all areas simultaneously.  Consequently, all of the main effects of teacher salary, 
principal salary, class size and pupil/support personnel ratio must be compared to 
determine which has the largest impact and is therefore the best use of limited resources.  
I propose the following research question: 
RQ: Does teacher salary, principal salary, class size or the ratio of students to 
support personnel account for the largest share of variance in student achievement as 
measured by SOL scores? 
Supplemental Analysis, Region 
 The diversity found across an entire state has the potential to minimize the impact 
of some of the independent variables because what is a competitive salary in a low cost of 




living area may not be competitive in a high cost of living area.  Costs of living vary 
widely from one school district to another.  In some districts, a basic three bedroom 
house can be purchased for less than $100,000 while in other locations the same house 
would cost $500,000.  Allen (2005), in a review of literature, concluded the acceptability 
of salaries is determined by how they compare to salaries of others in their area or in 
nearby school systems (p. 91).  This means districts are in competition with one another 
to offer the best salaries.  What is unknown is how much money a district needs to offer 
to be competitive, or how low they can drop their salaries without having an impact on 
student achievement.  
 Because of regional differences and the research of Allen (2005), I suggest a 
division’s average salary may be sufficient to attract high quality teachers if it is better, or 
at least as good, as those of surrounding divisions.  In order to get an accurate picture of 
how much a district needs to spend on salaries, it will likely be more useful to examine 
salary across a region than across an entire state.  First there should be a greater 
homogeneity between districts who are neighbors. Second, as neighboring districts are 
likely in competition with one another, it is reasonable the district with the highest 
salaries relative to other salaries in a region will get the highest scores.  With this in 
mind, I propose the following hypotheses:  
H6: Spending more on teacher and principal salary and having a smaller student to 
teacher ratio relative to other divisions in a region will have a larger impact on student 
achievement than spending relative to the entire state.   
Moderating Effects 




 Knowing how various inputs impact student achievement is useful and may be of 
some help when superintendents make personnel decisions but what is perhaps more 
useful is to understand under what conditions particular spending inputs are most or least 
warranted.  For example, I hypothesized a positive overall relationship for teacher salary 
and student achievement; while this may be true, it may not be true for all situations.  
Furthermore it may be more important under some situations than others.  In order to help 
make this determination, I examine demographic and economic moderating variables to 
better understand the conditions that influence the effects of different types of spending 
on achievement. 
 This further investigation is crucial when examining inputs such as class size.  
Based on the majority of the evidence reviewed, I hypothesize smaller class sizes are 
beneficial.  However, there are studies showing little or no benefit to smaller classes.  
This indicates a one-size fits all approach to examining the intricacies of division 
spending may be flawed.  By examining inputs that serve as moderating effects I hope to 
discover when smaller class sizes are most important. 
 Population density.  Rural, suburban, and urban districts are different places with 
different needs.  The low population density, lack of amenities, and peaceful open spaces 
of a rural setting stand in stark contrast to the high density urban landscape.  However, 
both rural and urban districts share the common trait—they are not as desirable a place to 
live as the suburbs.  Suburbs could be viewed as the ideal place to live and are in many 
respects more attractive to potential employees than either rural or urban districts.  
Consequently, those divisions operating in rural and urban areas often have more trouble 
filling their staffing needs. 




Teachers often look to teach in a school with a similar background to the one in 
which they grew-up.  Teachers from top colleges are statistically more likely to have 
grown up in suburbs compared to teachers from urban areas who are more likely to have 
attended less selective colleges (Jacobs, 2004, p. 140).  This would theoretically put non-
suburban districts (rural and urban) in a bind as they would have a built-in disadvantage 
in attracting the best teachers and would have to compensate for this through other hiring 
and retention incentives such as higher salaries.  This points to the idea that some districts 
may have to pay higher salaries than other districts in order to get the same quality 
teachers.  This would be due to some districts/divisions being more attractive places to 
live and work than other districts. 
 Monk (2007) proposed an attractiveness theory to explain the difficulties some 
districts have in attracting high-quality teachers.  In this theory, the overall attractiveness 
of an area plays a role in determining the salary for which employees are willing to work.  
This theory explains why a rural school district with a low cost of living may still need to 
pay a higher salary to attract workers.  This makes the case that if a less attractive district 
fails to pay a sufficient salary, they will have less qualified teachers (p. 162).  Monk 
(2007) also points out teachers typically prefer to teach in an area similar to the one in 
which they grew up which puts rural districts at a disadvantage as they typically produce 
fewer college graduates than suburban districts. 
 Urban schools have a unique set of problems and like their rural counterparts, 
often struggle to find the best qualified teachers.  Jacobs (2007) reports urban students 
score lower on achievement tests, have higher poverty, unemployment, and crime rates, 
an eroding tax base, and crowded schools (p. 132-133).  Because of these problems, 




urban areas face some of the same attractiveness challenges as rural schools.  Teachers in 
high poverty urban settings are more likely to lack a degree in the subject they are 
teaching and are more likely to have struggled to pass the teaching exam (Greenlee & 
Brown, 2009, p. 96).  This creates the unfortunate situation where the neediest students 
are often served by the least qualified teachers. 
 Theoretically, areas designated as suburban, but not urban, are more attractive 
places to work than rural or urban environments.   While many of the things that make a 
district attractive are innate to a district, there are things a district can do to improve their 
relative attractiveness.  Guarinio, et al. (2006), recognize multiple things go into making 
a district “attractive”.  They describe what makes a district attractive as a combination of 
factors including work load, working conditions and compensation.  They suggest school 
divisions can adjust their attractiveness by improving compensation or other work 
conditions in order to ensure their demand for teachers is met.  Divisions can also adjust 
the demand by changing the size of their typical class (p. 175).  This means a division 
can, with the right incentives, overcome an innate lack of attractiveness. 
 Research indicates to overcome a lack of attractiveness, divisions may need to, 
but often do not, adjust their employee compensation.  Jimerson (2003) investigated the 
unique elements of teacher compensation in rural areas and noted rural compensation is 
usually much lower than urban compensation.  This is justified due to what is typically 
but not always, a lower cost of living.  And while rural teachers do typically have lower 
housing costs, teachers in rural areas often have higher transportation costs as they need a 
car and will likely drive more miles due to the spread-out nature of rural areas.  
Additionally, due to a lack of desirability, rural districts may have trouble enticing 




teachers to move there and so may have to offer higher salaries in order to attract and hire 
qualified teachers (p. 11). 
 According to Jacobs (2007), urban schools typically have a harder time hiring 
teachers than their suburban counterparts (p. 129).   In executing recruiting activities, 
larger and urban school districts have advantages and disadvantages.  The larger size of 
some urban districts allows them to recruit teachers over a wider area.  However, they 
can also have cumbersome bureaucratic systems that prevent them from efficient hiring 
(p. 133).   The recruiting problems of urban districts are especially pronounced when they 
are seeking math and science teachers.  Consequently, it is likely one will find an 
achievement gap in math scores above what we see in reading.   
 Figlio (2002) hypothesized that quality teachers may self-select to higher paying 
districts out of a preference for living in suburbs, where they are more likely to have 
grown up (as suburbs produce more college graduates), and which also typically pay 
better (p. 687).  So, it is possible the environment of the district, rather than the higher 
salary is what attracts the best teachers.   
Given the different challenges faced by rural and urban districts and the added 
difficulty of recruiting teachers caused by a lack of attractiveness, rural and urban 
districts will likely need to pay higher salaries than their suburban counterparts in order to 
attract quality teachers.  The lack of support structures available to students in rural and 
urban areas will also likely result in more of a benefit in smaller class sizes.   
  District wealth.  Wealthier school districts have advantages over poorer districts.  
First, they are more likely to have an educated population.  Second, they have more 
resources.  Third, they may be more attractive places to live.  As was previously noted, 




rural and urban schools are typically poorer than their suburban counterparts.  However, 
this is not always the case as there are rural resort communities and gentrified urban areas 
that are anomalies.  Consequently wealth and population density are unlikely to perfectly 
overlap and should be examined separately. 
 The lower desirability of poorer districts, just like urban and rural districts, 
presents a challenge in recruiting the best teachers.  Divisions located in these places may 
need to do something else to make their divisions more attractive places to work.  
Greenlee and Brown (2009), in a survey of 99 teachers in Florida, found salary and 
benefits to be important in high poverty schools relative to low poverty schools (p. 96).   
This would indicate high poverty environments are less desirable places to work and 
therefore require a higher salary to attract quality teachers. 
 There is a considerable amount of research indicating the unique challenges posed 
by high-poverty schools require the very best leadership.  The research makes it clear the 
importance of a principal’s leadership traits change based on demographics.  Charlotte 
Advocates for Education (2004) studied principals who were successful in high poverty 
areas and found principals who are successful are self-motivated, visionary leaders, risk 
takers and problem solvers who provide their teachers with continuous feedback (p. 2).  
Such a principal is unlikely to be cheap. 
Greenlee and Brown (2009) found teachers in high poverty schools place a greater 
value on working for a strong principal who sets a positive tone and vision than teachers 
in low poverty schools (p. 105).  This indicates the leadership in a high poverty school is 
more important than in lower poverty schools.  Unfortunately, low-income schools are 
more likely to have principals in their first year or with less experience than higher 




income schools (Rice, 2010, p. 5).  This is bad news for student achievement as 
according to Rice (2010), citing research of (Clark, Martorell & Rockoff, 2009), a 
principal’s level of experience matters when determining student performance, especially 
in math (p. 2).  This means the schools most in need of an experienced leader are the ones 
who are most likely to have a principal lacking that crucial experience.  This should have 
an impact on student achievement and an especially strong impact on math. 
 The literature supports the common belief the principal can impact student 
achievement. O’Donnell and White (2003) found a significant relationship between 
student achievement and teacher ratings of principal leadership.  However, they found 
this relationship only existed at schools with a high SES population indicating the wealth 
of a district may play a role in the importance of a principal’s leadership.   
 Much of the research on what students who live in poverty need indicates forming 
a relationship with teachers is crucial for their learning (Payne, 2003, 2009).  It is much 
easier to form relationships when class sizes are smaller.  Consequently small class sizes 
should be more important in less affluent settings than in wealthier environments. 
 It is clear from the literature high poverty districts need the best leadership and 
teachers but have an attractiveness problem that inhibits their ability to recruit the best 
employees.  Improved salary is one thing that could compensate for a lack of 
attractiveness and higher salaries should result in better teachers and better student 
achievement at high poverty schools.  Additionally, the challenges of poverty should 
make small classes more important in less wealthy environments than in more wealthy 
environments. With this in mind I will examine how wealth moderates the effect of 
teacher salary, principal salary, and class size using three different measurements of 




wealth. The first, median household income, is an indicator of the wealth of the average 
resident of a district. The second, the composite index score, shows the overall amount of 
wealth existing in a district.  The third, fiscal stress, represents the funding a district could 
realistically raise through an increase in taxes. 
Summary of Moderation Hypotheses 
 Population density  (hypotheses H1a-H4a).  The relationship between the main 
effect variables (per-pupil spending, teacher and principal salary, and pupil/teacher ratio) 
on student achievement scores will be stronger in rural and urban schools than in 
suburban schools. 
Wealth (hypotheses H1b-H4b).  The relationship between the main effect 
variables (per-pupil spending, teacher and principal salary, and pupil/teacher ratio) on 
student achievement scores will be stronger in poorer districts than in wealthier districts. 
Table 1 












H1a H2a H3a H4a 
Wealth H2a H2b H3b H4b 
 
Method 
 The participants in this study were composed of the 132 school divisions operated 
by counties and cities in Virginia.  According to membership (enrollment) numbers they 
vary widely in size from Highland County with 185 students to Fairfax County with 
182,157 students (VDOE, 2015b).  Additionally, Virginia’s school divisions serve a 
mixture of affluent areas, and areas where poverty is prevalent.  Some divisions serve 




suburban areas while others serve rural or urban areas.  Regardless of the population or 
geographic location, each school system follows a similar curriculum as is prescribed by 
the Virginia Standards of Learning and their corresponding SOL tests. 
 Each school division has its own school board and makes its own decisions within 
parameters set by the Virginia Standards of Quality.  Each school system is led by a 
superintendent who is supervised by a school board that is either directly elected or is 
appointed by the legislative body in that district.  School boards and their superintendents 
have a significant amount of discretion when determining how their money is spent.  
However, no school division has an unlimited amount of money and so it must be spent 
in such a manner as to get the best possible student learning outcomes. 
Main Effect Measures 
 All main effect measures were collected from The Superintendent’s Annual 
Report (VDOE, 2015a).  This is a series of annual reports sent to the Virginia Department 
of Education from the individual school divisions containing statistics on all elements of 
the division’s operation.  All of the main effect measurements were extrapolated from 
this source.  The data is published in 19 separate tables and is made available to the 
public on the Department of Education website 
(http://www.pen.k12.va.us/statistics_reports/supts_annual_report/2014_15/index.shtml).  
 Per-pupil expenditures.  Different school systems spend vastly different 
amounts of money, even on a per-pupil level.  For example, at the low end the medium 
sized King George County (4288 students), spends only an average of $8,740 per student 
annually.  At the other extreme, the very small Highland County spends an average of 




$19,728 per student per year.  The median per-pupil expenditure is $10,672.50.  All per-
pupil spending estimates are expressed in dollars and are reported in units of $10,000.   
 Teacher salary.  Teacher salary varies widely across Virginia.  At the low end of 
the range, Tazwell County pays teachers an average of $37,035 per year while, at the 
high end, Arlington pays teachers an average of $74,534 per year.  The median teacher 
salary across Virginia school divisions is $47,575.24.  These numbers are an average 
salary in dollars paid to teachers in each division.  Consequently this number is driven by 
two factors; first, the salary scale for PK-12 teachers adapted by each division which is 
based largely on experience and second, where the teachers in the division fall on that 
scale. Teacher salary is reported in units of $10,000. 
 Principal salary.  Principal salary varies even more widely than teacher salary.  
The average principal salaries range from Buena Vista City at $46,597 to Arlington 
which pays principals an average of $143,205 (VDOE, 2015a).  The median average 
principal’s salary in Virginia is $84,287.31.  Principal salary is reported in units of 
$10,000. 
 Pupil/teacher ratio.  The pupil/teacher ratio is simply the number of students per 
teacher in a school system.  This number is reported by school divisions to the Virginia 
Department of Education and includes all types of teachers, both classroom teachers and 
teachers in supporting roles. Classroom teachers are those teachers at any grade who are 
responsible for a classroom of students.  Teachers in supporting roles may pull out small 
groups of students for remediation or provide other professional services such as 
librarian.  It is not a perfect measure of class size, but is a good measure of the amount of 
individual attention from professional staff available to students.  The numbers reported 




represent the number of students per teacher and range from 6.90 to 16.67 with a median 
of 12.16. 
 Pupil/support personnel ratio.  Unlike with teachers who are all lumped into 
one category, school divisions report the number of support personnel they employ 
broken down by category.  Those personnel falling into the Department of Education’s 
categories of “instruction” and “administration, attendance and health” categories are the 
ones most likely to have an impact on instruction.  This is because they have a direct role 
working with students and assisting the teachers who provide the instruction by 
performing tasks which allow the teachers to better focus on instruction.  The numbers of 
personnel in these categories were summed and divided into the total number of students 
in a division in order to obtain an overall pupil/support personnel ratio.  This ratio 
indicates the number of students per one support person and varies widely across the state 
ranging from 8.95 to 179.6 with a median of 56.73. 
Moderator Measures 
 Interactions were computed for each of the main effect variables with the 
moderating variables indicating a division’s population density and wealth as measured 
by both median household income and Department of Education Composite Index.  This 
created new variables representing the interaction between the main effects and these 
specific moderators. 
 Population Density.  
 Urban.  The U.S. Census Bureau defines an area to be “Urban” if it has a 
population greater than 50,000 and a population density of at least 1000 people per 
square mile.  Virginia has five areas that meet the definition of “Urban”.  Areas with an 




urban designation are the Northern Virginia area around Washington D.C, Richmond, the 
Hampton Roads/Norfolk area, Lynchburg, and Roanoke.  Districts falling into one of 
these five “urban” zones were classified as urban.   
 Suburban. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget, using this data, provides 
“metropolitan” designations to areas.  To be classified as “metro” an area must have a 
core urban area (at least 50,000 people) and be economically intertwined with the urban 
area (USDA, n.d.).  Areas defined as “metro” but not as “urban” are hypothetically very 
attractive as they provide easy access to the amenities of city life without the crowds and 
negative traits associated with urban areas.  Approximately half of the districts in 
Virginia are designated as “metro” which indicates a reasonable proximity to one of the 
five urban areas.  That said many of the metro areas have a rural feeling and a low 
population density.  However, given their proximity to an urban center, they are still 
arguably more desirable than the rural counties that lack such proximity (USDA, n.d.).  I 
classified those districts which fall into an area designated as “metro” as “suburban”. 
  Rural. A district is designated as “rural” if it lacks the population density of a 
core area of at least 50,000 and fewer than 1000 people per square mile and it is not 
economically intertwined with a core urban area.  Fifty-three districts in Virginia meet 
these criteria and were designated as “rural”. 
 In order to use multiple linear regression (MLR) with this as a categorical 
variable, I created two new dummy coded variables labeled “rural” and “urban” such that 
suburban is the reference group.  For the new variable “rural”, rural districts were coded 
as “1” and non-rural districts were  coded as “0”.  For “urban”, urban districts were coded 
as “1” and non-urban districts coded with “0”. As each hypothesis was tested, the data 




was examined to see if a district’s classification changed the nature of the relationship 
between the main effect variables and student achievement. 
 Wealth.  In order to determine how the wealth of a district impacts its need to 
spend money on personnel, I used three different measurements of a district’s wealth.  
The first, the composite index, measures the total wealth available to a division in the 
form of potential tax revenue.  The second measure is median household income which 
measures the individual wealth of residents within a district.  The third measure, fiscal 
stress, represents the funding a district could realistically raise through an increase in 
taxes.  
 Composite index.  The composite index represents the percentage of local versus 
state funding a division must pay.  It is calculated using a weighted formula where 
property values count for 50%, gross income for 40%, and taxable sales for 10%.  The 
Virginia Department of Education adjusts the composite index to ensure the state pays no 
more, than 45% of total education funding based on minimum funding requirements 
established by DOE for the entire state.  This figure is expressed as the percentage of a 
school division’s funding that must come from local sources.  This ranges from 18% for 
the poorest districts to 80% for the wealthiest districts.  The median district must raise 
36% of funds from local sources.  As it takes several things into account, it is an excellent 
indicator of the total amount of wealth that exists in a district but not of the personal 
wealth of the residents.  
 Median household income.  In order to account for the wealth of individuals 
residing in a particular district, I used the median household income numbers for each 
district as computed by the U.S. Census Bureau.  The median household income numbers 




provide insight into the socioeconomic condition of the residents.  This additional 
measurement is useful as it is possible for a district to have a healthy tax base (due to 
high property values caused by a resort, attraction or large business) but still have a high 
number of citizens with a low income.  Median household income numbers are available 
from the U.S. Census Bureau.  The wealthiest district has a median household income of 
$123,996, the poorest $27,746 while the median district has a median household income 
of $47,673.50.  Median household income numbers are reported in units of $10,000. 
 Fiscal stress. As neither composite index nor median household income are 
perfect measures of a district’s wealth (James Regimbal, personal communication, 
December 6, 2016), I added the Fiscal Stress Index as prepared by the Commonwealth of 
Virginia Commission on Local Government (2016).  The index, centered at 100, equally 
weights per capita revenue capacity (the amount that could be raised if residents were 
taxed at the state average), revenue effort (the ratio of actual taxes compared to capacity) 
and median household income (p. 2).  This measurement is different as it combines 
factors and includes the amount of revenue a locality is already accessing thus indicating 
the additional funding that could be realistically raised through additional taxes.   
 Region.  The Virginia Department of Education divides districts into eight 
different geographic regions (VDOE, 2016).  In order to assess the impact of the 
individual main effects relative to the other districts in a region, I computed an average 
for each region for each of the main effects.   I then computed the difference between the 
region average and the numbers for each district to show how each school division 
compares to other districts within the same region. 
Outcome Measures  




Student Achievement.  Reading and math Standards of Learning (SOL) test 
scores serve as indicators of student achievement and as the dependent variables for this 
study. These scores represent the percentage of students who earned a minimum passing 
score (400) on the tests.  The tests themselves are criterion referenced and are on a scale 
of 0-600 with a score of 400 representing passing.  For most tests, a score of 400 
indicates students answered slightly more than half of the questions correctly.  Reading 
and math scores were selected as the dependent variables because it is these scores by 
which a school system is judged under No Child Left Behind.  This data is available from 
The Virginia Department of Education School System Report Cards.  The 2014-2015 
school year was used as this is the most recent year for which there is data (VDOE 
2015a). 
Procedure 
 The main effects of the independent variables, per pupil expenditures (H1), 
average teacher salary (H2), average principal salary (H3), pupil/teacher ratio (H4), and 
pupil support/personnel ratio (H5) were tested using SPSS by estimating bivariate 
correlation coefficients with the reading and math SOL scores across school divisions.  
Examining these correlations allowed me to tell which main effects are related to reading 
and math scores and if the relationship was positive or negative.  Further information 
concerning the significance of the main effects was obtained by using single linear 
regression to obtain slopes for each of the main effect variables on both reading and math 
scores.  Once independent variables with positive correlations were identified, they were 
placed in on a MLR model which was tested to determine which independent variable 
accounts for the largest share of variance (RQ). 




 In order to assess the importance of a division’s spending relative to other 
divisions in their region (H6), main effects within region were examined by computing a 
new term for the main effects average teacher salary, average principal salary and 
pupil/teacher ratio showing each division’s distance from the region average.  Bivariate 
correlations were computed for each of the main effects with math and reading scores to 
show the importance of each of the different spending inputs within a region. 
 The moderating effects of a district’s population density (H1a-H4a), and a district’s 
wealth (H1b-H4b) on reading and math SOL scores were tested for each main effect using 
MLR model building (Hypothesis H1a-H4a and H1b-H4b).   
 Before the model could be built, interaction terms were computed by multiplying 
each centered main effect variable (per-pupil expenditures, average teacher salary, 
average principal salary, and pupil/teacher ratio) by the moderating variables.  For 
population density, dummy coded terms “urban” and “rural” were used.  For wealth, I 
computed three sets of terms.  The first computed term used centered composite index, 
the second used centered median household income, and the third term used fiscal stress 
as a proxies for wealth.  This process provided terms representing the interactions 
between the moderator and main effect variables. 
 A series of separate MLR models was tested to evaluate each hypothesis 
containing the main effects of centered independent and moderating variables, and their 
interaction terms.  For example, in order to test H1a dealing with the moderating effect of 
population density between per-pupil expenditures and student achievement, three MLR 
models were tested for both the math and reading independent variables.  The first model 
contains just the main effect for per-pupil expenditures.  The second model added the 




moderating variables, “rural” and “urban” (representing “population density”).  The third 
model added the computed interaction terms between per-pupil expenditures and urban 
and rural density dummy codes.  By examining the R2 change and corresponding p value 
I was able to tell how much variance each component added.  Similar separate models 
containing each of the main effect, moderating variables, and interaction terms were  
tested to evaluate all of the hypotheses for both the reading and math independent 
variables.  Hypothesis H1b-H4b were tested separately using composite index, median 
household income, and fiscal stress as proxies for wealth.  Testing these models indicated 
which interactions were significant and how much incremental variance each model 
predicted. 
Results 
 Descriptive statistics shown in Table 2 indicate that while there are large 
differences between school divisions in principal salary, median household income, and 
pupil/support personnel ratio, the other differences between divisions as indicated by 
standard deviations, are fairly small.  This is especially true for pupil/teacher ratio and for 
both dependent variables (reading and math scores). 
 Pearson correlations shown in Table 3 indicate, as one would expect, a very high 
correlation between reading and math scores indicating most divisions perform at similar 
levels in both areas of student achievement.  A division’s status as rural was also found to 
be a significant predictor of student achievement.  The correlations with the largest 
practical implications are the strong correlations between any of the three measures of 
wealth and most of the other studied variables. For example, median household income is 
significantly correlated with every other variable except for pupil/support personnel.  In 




fact, median household income and fiscal stress are more highly correlated with reading 
and math than any of the other variables including composite index indicating the 
powerful role wealth plays in all things related to education. 
Main Effects (H1-H5) 
 Bivariate correlation results for Hypotheses 1-5 are shown in Table 3. Regression 
results for these hypotheses are shown in Table 4. 
 Per-Pupil Expenditures (H1). The correlations between per-pupil expenditures 
and student achievement as measured by SOL scores proved to be non-significant for 
both math and reading.  Consequently, we can accept H1 that there is no relationship 
between per-pupil expenditures and student achievement as measured by SOL scores. 
 Teacher Salary (H2). The correlation between a division’s average teacher salary 
and student achievement as measured by SOL scores is significant for both math and for 
reading.  Consequently we can accept H2 and conclude there is a positive relationship 
between a division’s spending on teacher salary and SOL scores.  While the R2 values 
indicating teacher salary accounts for 5.7% of the variance in math SOL scores and 4.8% 
in reading SOL scores is meaningful and indicates the best performing divisions also pay 
the best, a large salary increase alone would be an impractical way of raising SOL scores.  
An examination of the regression slopes (See Table 4) indicates for a 1 percentage point 
improvement in average SOL pass rates average individual teacher salaries would have to 
increase by over $300,000 for math and over $400,000 for reading.  Consequently, while 
the correlation is statistically significant, the increase in salaries needed to impact a 
division’s SOL scores is not practical. 




 Principal Salary (H3).  Results indicate the correlation between the average 
salary a school division pays to a principal and SOL scores is small but statistically 
significant for math but not for reading.  These findings partially support H3.  As with 
teacher salary, the impact of principal salary is statistically significant with 4.8% of the 
variance in math scores being attributable to principal salary.  However, a 1 point 
increase in average math SOL pass rates would require a $1 million increase in principal 
salary.  So, while the best performing divisions do pay the best, raising salaries alone is 
unlikely to have a large impact.   
 Pupil/Teacher Ratio (H4). Results indicate the correlation between pupil teacher 
ratio and student achievement is non-significant for both math and for reading.  This 
either indicates class size is unimportant or, as indicated by a small standard deviation, 
there is very little practical difference in the class sizes across the state.  Consequently 
there is no evidence of a significant relationship between class size and student 
achievement and so we are unable to reject the null and accept H4. 
 Support ratio (H5).   An examination of the bivariate correlations shown in table 
3 between the pupil/support personnel and student achievement indicates no significant 
relationship exists for either math or for reading.  The evidence indicates no significant 
relationship exists between the pupil/support personnel ratio and student achievement and 
so we are unable to reject the null and accept H5.  
 Largest impact (RQ).  In order to determine which predictor accounts for the 
largest share of variance in SOL scores, MLR model building was used to compare the 
impact of average teacher salary, average principal salary, pupil/teacher ratio and total 
support ratio.  Assumptions for multicollinearity were met with all VIF statistics less than 




4.  Results shown in Table 5 indicate the only predictor to account for a significant 
portion of variance is teacher salary which is significant for both math and reading.  
When other predictors are added they do not make a significant contribution to the 
variance.  Furthermore, an examination of semi-partial correlations indicates that, 
controlling for all other predictors in the model, teacher salary accounts for 1% of the 
unique variance in math and 2% of unique variance in reading while the next largest (not 
statistically significant) is total support ratio at only .5% for math and principal salary at 
.1% for reading.  Consequently teacher salary is the only independent variable to make a 
meaningful contribution to variance on student achievement.  However, the slopes were 
extremely small such that for a 1 percentage point gain in SOL pass rates teacher salaries 
would need to increase by $366,703 for math and $437,254 for reading, adjusting for the 
effects of other predictors in the model.  Average teacher salary accounts for the largest 
and only statistically significant share of variance, but raising teacher salaries alone is 
unlikely to have much of an impact on student achievement scores.  So, the overall 
answer to the research question is average teacher salary has the largest impact on student 
achievement. 
Supplemental Analysis: Main Effects within Region (H6)  
In order to determine the effects of a division’s average teacher salary, average 
principal salary, and pupil/teacher ratio on student achievement compared to other 
divisions in a region, regional averages were computed and the differences found were 
used to create new terms indicating each division’s standing relative to the regional 
average.   Bivariate correlations, reported in Table 6, for teacher salary, principal salary, 
and pupil/teacher ratio were computed within region and compared to those computed 




with state-wide data.  H6 stated the correlations would be greater within region than 
across the entire state.  An examination of the bivariate correlations revealed no practical 
difference between correlations within region and those across the entire state.    
Consequently, we are unable to reject the null and accept H6 as offering a higher salary 
than neighboring districts is by itself insufficient to raise student achievement.  
Summary of H1-H6 and Largest Impact (RQ) 
 Results for H1-H6 and RQ are reported in Tables 3-6.  As was expected, per-pupil 
expenditures was not correlated with student achievement. Teacher salary proved to be a 
statistically significant predictor of student achievement (H2), but the practical 
significance associated with the effect was trivial.  Principal salary exhibited a 
statistically significant relationship with math but not with reading scores (H3), but the 
practical significance of the effect was again trivial.  Pupil/teacher ratio had no impact on 
student achievement (H4).  Pupil/support personnel ratio also had no impact on student 
achievement (H5).  No differences were found when comparing the main effect variables 
within region to those from across the entire state (H6).    
Population Density (H1a-H4a) 
 In order to determine the moderating role of population density on the relationship 
between each of the aforementioned main effect spending variables (per-pupil 
expenditures [H1a], teacher salary [H2a], principal salary [H3a], and pupil/teacher ratio 
[H4a]) and student achievement scores, I used a model building approach with MLR. In 
the first model I entered the centered main effect variable (e.g., per-pupil expenditures). 
In the second model I added the dummy coded “urban” and “rural” terms. In the third 
model I added the main effect variable’s interaction with each dummy coded population 




density term.  This process was repeated for 1) all four main effect spending variables 
and 2) both the reading and math independent variables.  Results are reported in Tables 7-
10. 
 Table 7 shows the model building results for per-pupil expenditures. Per-pupil 
expenditures was not related to student achievement.  However, a district’s status as rural 
was a significant predictor of both math and reading scores, indicating rural school 
divisions scored significantly lower than non-urban school divisions. Neither of the 
interaction terms including per-pupil expenditures and the population density dummy 
coded terms were statistically significant, lending no support to H1a. 
 Table 8 shows the model building results for teacher salary.  While teacher salary 
by itself is a significant predictor of student achievement, when you consider teacher 
salary’s interactions with “urban” and “rural” teacher salary is no longer significant.  In 
the third model, when the interactions between teacher salary and “urban” and “rural” are 
added, “rural” becomes a significant predictor of student achievement for both reading 
and math and “urban” becomes a significant predictor for reading.  Given the lack of 
significance of the interaction terms, we are unable to accept H2a.  
 Table 9 shows the model building results for principal salary.  While principal 
salary by itself was related to student achievement for math, in the third model when the 
interactions are considered it loses its significance.  Principal salary does not have a 
significant impact on reading scores.  When the third model is considered both the terms 
“rural” and “urban” become significant for reading.  However, none of the interaction 
terms were significant for either reading or math giving no support to H3a. 




 Table 10 shows the model building results for pupil/teacher ratio on population 
density.  Pupil teacher ratio was not related to student achievement.  The term “urban” 
was not related to student achievement but the term “rural” was related to both reading 
and math.  Interaction terms were not significant for either reading or math giving no 
support to H4a. 
Summary of H1a-H4a Findings 
 After testing the moderating effect of a district’s population density as determined 
by a district’s position as either rural, suburban, or urban, I can conclude population 
density does not play either a practically or statistically significant role in moderating the 
effects of per-pupil expenditures, teacher salary, principal salary, or pupil/teacher ratio on 
student achievement.  This indicates a district’s population density does not drive the 
need to spend money on personnel with respect to student achievement.  While rural and 
urban districts obviously have unique sets of challenges, greater spending among 
district’s in rural or urban settings does not differentially affect student achievement 
scores.  However, this does not mean rural and urban districts do not have challenges 
above those of their suburban counterparts.  Controlling for all other variables in the final 
models, the “rural” dummy code main effect showed a fairly consistent statistically 
significant, negative effect (see Tables 7-10), indicating students in rural areas often do 
not perform as well as those in suburban areas.  While none of the hypotheses concerning 
the moderating effect of population density on student achievement (H1a-H4a) were 
supported, rural divisions clearly did not perform as well as others.  
Wealth (H1b-H4b) 




 Composite index, median household income, and fiscal stress were used as 
different measures to represent the wealth of a district.  When these three wealth 
indicators are examined as predictor variables instead of as moderators, all three show a 
strong correlation with both reading and math scores (see Table 3).  Fiscal stress, the 
wealth indicator with the strongest correlation, accounts for 21% of the variance in math 
and 25% of the variance in reading. 
 In order the test for the moderating effect of wealth on the relationship between 
each of the aforementioned main effect spending variables (per-pupil expenditures [H1b], 
teacher salary [H2b], principal salary [H3b], and pupil/teacher ratio [H4b]) and student 
achievement scores, I used a model building approach with MLR similar to that used 
above to test H1a- H4a. Again, I entered the main effect of each separate spending variable 
in the first model (e.g., per-pupil expenditures). In the second model I added the main 
effect for the wealth indicator. Finally, in the third model I added the interaction between 
the spending variable and wealth indicator to test the moderating effect. As was the case 
for testing H1a- H4a, above, this process was repeated here for 1) all four main effect 
spending variables and 2) both the reading and math independent variables. In addition, I 
operationalized “wealth” in three different ways (i.e., composite index, median household 
income, and fiscal stress), meaning I tested each set of models separately using each of 
these measures of wealth.    
 Per-pupil expenditures (H1b). Tables 11-13 show the model building results for 
per-pupil expenditures.  Per-pupil expenditures was not related to student achievement.  
A district’s wealth, whether measured by composite index, median household income, or 
fiscal stress was related to student achievement in both reading and math indicating the 




powerful role wealth plays as predictor of student achievement.  When, in Table 11, a 
district’s wealth as measured by composite index is considered, per-pupil expenditure 
becomes significant.  This was not the case when wealth is measured with either median 
household income or fiscal stress.  Still, none of the interactions were significant for 
either reading or math lending no support to H1b.
 Teacher Salary (H2b). Tables 14-16 show the model building results for teacher 
salary.  Teacher salary was related to student achievement.  When controlling for teacher 
salary, the composite index measure of wealth was not a significant predictor of student 
achievement (Table 14). However, both median household income and fiscal stress 
(Tables 15-16) were significant predictors for both reading and math scores when 
controlling for teacher salary.  When the interaction terms were considered, teacher salary 
only had a significant effect to on reading and then only when using median household 
income as a predictor of wealth. None of the interaction terms for teacher salary and 
wealth were significant lending no support to H2b.  
 Average Principal Salary (H3b).  Tables 17-19 show the model building results 
for principal salary.  Principal salary by itself was related to math, but not reading SOL 
scores.  Principal salary continues to have a significant effect on student achievement in 
math when adding the interactions between principal salary and composite index.  It no 
longer has a significant effect on math when measuring wealth with either median 
household income or fiscal stress.  While principal salary by itself was not related to 
student achievement in reading, it becomes significant when the interaction term with 
median household income was added.  However, regardless of the measurement used for 
wealth, none of the interaction terms were significant giving little support to H3b.  




 Pupil/Teacher Ratio (H4b). Tables 20-22 show the model building results for 
pupil/teacher ratio.  Pupil/teacher ratio was not related to student achievement.  While 
wealth, as measured by either composite index, median household income or fiscal stress 
is related to student achievement in both math and reading, none of the interaction terms 
were significant.  Consequently, there is no support for H4b.
Summary of H1b-H4b Findings 
 I found no evidence that school division spending on any of the four spending 
inputs, per-pupil expenditures, average teacher salary, average principal salary or 
pupil/teacher ratio differed based on the wealth of a district whether measured by 
composite index, median household income, or fiscal stress.  Thus there is no support for 
H1b-H4b.  Furthermore, after examining the impact wealth has when combined with the 
main effect variables per-pupil expenditures, average teacher salary, average principal 
salary, and pupil/teacher ratio is clear it is a district’s wealth and not the main effect 
spending variables that primarily impact student achievement.  The significance of the 
impact of teacher salary on student achievement disappears when you control for wealth 
with either composite index of fiscal stress and it disappears for math when controlled 
with median household income.  Furthermore, the significance “average principal salary” 
shows as a predictor of math scores goes away when controlling for wealth by any 
measure.  In summary, wealth is a consistent barrier to student achievement and there is 
no evidence any of the tested variables are in a position to change that. 
 Discussion 
  
 This study examines the effects of personnel related spending inputs (per-pupil 
expenditures, average teacher salary, average principal salary, pupil teacher ratio, and 
pupil/support personnel ratio) on student achievement as measured by reading and math 




SOL scores.  This study builds on the existing literature to examine whether or not a 
district’s region, population density, (rural, suburban, urban), and wealth (as measured by 
composite index, median household income, and fiscal stress) moderate the effects of 
spending inputs on student achievement.  Teacher salary and principal salary were the 
only main effect spending variables to demonstrate a significant relationship with student 
achievement.  Considering a district’s region had no effect of the effects of spending 
units on student achievement, nor did the relationship between spending inputs and 
student achievement differ as a function of district population density or wealth.  While 
all of the interactions were non-significant, the effects of one set of control variables—
that is, indicators of wealth (i.e., composite index, median household income, and fiscal 
stress)—showed the strongest effects on student achievement when treated as a main 
effect indicating SOL scores are higher in wealthier parts of the state than in poorer parts 
of the state.  I will discuss potential explanations for and implications of the failure to 
support the stated hypotheses as it was a districts wealth and not overall per-pupil 
expenditures, any of the personnel related inputs, or any of the wealth or population 
density interactions that had the largest impact on student achievement. 
Per-pupil Expenditures   
 Findings support the work of Coleman (1966), Hanushek (1986), Agasisti (2014) 
and Schanchter, (2010) who found spending alone is insufficient to raise student 
achievement.  However, these findings should not be used as an excuse to cut or to not 
provide funding.  First, all districts have unique needs and may be spending the right 
amount to meet their needs and cutting funding could have disastrous consequences.  
Second, the largest predictor of student achievement is wealth and as such, it will likely 




take money to fix this problem.  While there is nothing in this study’s results that proves 
an increase in spending will help the poorest districts, 40 out of the 50 poorest districts 
spend below the state mean.  This makes it difficult to rule out spending more money as a 
solution for the problems faced by the poorest districts as the lack of poor districts with 
above average spending makes this like an experimental study with no treatment group.  
What these results do indicate is an across the board spending increase for all districts 
regardless of wealth will likely be meaningless unless leaders carefully examine both 
their needs related to inequality and other specific needs and carefully target spending 
towards solving those problems.  Further spending research should look at spending on 
specific issues and measure the success of that spending.  For example, does spending 
targeted on improving literacy in the earlier grades over time yield positive results across 
all grades?  Is it an effective use of money to have larger overall classes but to provide 
more direct instruction to the most at risk students?  An examination of these kinds of 
spending issues is needed to learn more about the intricacies of effective spending. 
Effects of Specific Types of Personnel Spending Inputs 
 Teacher salary had the largest impact on student achievement of any of the 
personnel spending variables.  Moreover, average teacher salary was the only personnel 
spending type to significantly predict both math and reading student achievement scores.  
This indicates that students in better paying districts perform better.  However, the flat 
slope indicates that teacher salaries would need to be raised highly unrealistic amounts to 
meaningfully impact student achievement.  That is, to increase a school division’s SOL 
test pass rates by 1% a 1000% salary increase would be required.  This estimate was 
much weaker than the relationship found by Figlio (1998) who found a 10% increase in 




starting salary should result in a 1.3% increase in student achievement (p. 247).  
However, this is not a direct comparison as Figlio’s (1998) study examined starting salary 
instead of looking at the average paid compensation as was done in this study.  
Nonetheless, these findings appear strongly counter to those put forth by Figlio.  Average 
principal salary was statistically significant for reading but not for math.  As with teacher 
salary the effect size for the reading scores was tiny with a slope so flat as to render it 
practically insignificant and the impact of principal salary goes away when you control 
for wealth.   
 Guarino et al. (2006) suggested teacher hiring and salaries were a supply/demand 
transaction with supply equaling the number of teachers who are willing to work for the 
offered compensation and demand as the number of open positions. Using Guarino et 
al.’s characterization, my findings could simply suggest the teacher supply is actually 
adequate to meet the current demands in Virginia.  Moreover, my findings suggest that 
districts are generally paying a salary (to teachers and principals) that is sufficient to meet 
their staffing needs with qualified applicants in keeping with other traits that make a 
school district a desirable place to work.   
 Ingesoll (2001) noted teacher salary was a reason teachers cited for transferring 
from one district to another.  However, it was not the only reason for either teacher or 
principal transfers.  It is possible when a teacher or principal leaves one school division 
for another they see a salary increase as an added bonus rather than as the driver of their 
decision.  Salary may just be a single item in the larger picture of school climate which 
includes support from administrators, student discipline and involvement in decision 
making (Ingersoll, 2001, p. 525).  In this scenario a teacher or principal may be content 




with a lower salary as long as other workplace factors are satisfactory.  It is also possible 
as teachers and principals leave one district for another they are replaced with reasonably 
qualified teachers and principals resulting in a practically minimal effect on student 
achievement.  This is especially likely, because according to Ingersoll (2001), teacher 
turnover is highest amongst the least experienced teachers (p. 502) meaning divisions 
may be swapping one inexperienced teacher for another sparing them the impact that 
would be felt from a loss of the most experienced teachers.  Additionally, as long as 
turnover rates are fairly low, it is unlikely to have a large impact on overall numbers.   
 In a surprise that runs counter to the common sense argument that the more 
teachers, the more individual attention and therefore the higher student achievement, 
pupil/teacher ratio was not found to be related to with student achievement.  This could 
indicate most of Virginia’s schools are operating in a sweet spot of pupil/teacher ratio, or 
that there is little practical difference in most of the class sizes. The range of average 
pupil/teacher ratio in Virginia is a minimum of 6.90 and a maximum of 16.67 with a 
mean of 12.12.  However, the standard deviation is extremely small, 1.51 indicating most 
divisions have similar pupil/teacher ratios.  This close distribution of pupil/teacher ratios 
could explain the results as while there may be a practical difference between a class of 
15 and a class of 30, it is unlikely there is much of a difference between a class of 12 and 
one of 14.   
 At first glance these results would seem to support the work of Coleman (1966) 
and Haunushek (1986) and refute the experimental studies of Jepson and Rivkin (2009) 
and Mosteller (1995).  However, the real world difference in class sizes in this study is 
much smaller than the experimental designs which used 20 students for a small class and 




30 students for a large class.  This could explain why the results of this study were non-
significant as the class sizes were all so similar as to make little practical difference. 
 The impact of support personnel on student achievement was found to be non-
significant.  Unlike the case of pupil/teacher ratio, this is not for a lack of meaningful 
differences between school divisions, as the range was considerable with a minimum of 
8.95 and a maximum of 179.08 support personnel per pupil with a standard deviation of 
18.94.  However, this may simply imply that most school divisions have employed the 
appropriate number of support personnel, in proportion to their enrollment numbers, to 
meet their needs based on factors not considered in this study.  In other words, while 
there is a need to maintain a fairly standard pupil/teacher ratio, regardless of other factors, 
the need to employ support personnel fluctuates widely based on factors not yet 
determined.  Further research is needed to determine under what conditions higher ratios 
of support personnel are needed or could be beneficial. 
 Returning to the issue of the personnel spending type with the largest impact, I 
conclude that if there is a single budgetary item that has both a large and meaningful 
impact on student achievement, it has not yet been found.  I recommend research on 
spending focus on two areas.  First, research should study the 20% of school division 
budgets that is not directly related to personnel as the results of this study indicate neither 
overall spending applied evenly and without regard for other economic factors, nor 
spending on specific personnel categories is an effective lever for moving student 
achievement numbers.   Second, it is possible personnel constitutes something of a “fixed 
cost” in education.  Leaders, while able to make slight adjustments, may feel any large 
decreases in their personnel spending would not allow them to complete their basic tasks.  




So, if personnel costs are largely fixed, future research may focus on the effects of 
increases in spending in non-personnel categories, such that the ratio of spending on 
personnel to non-personnel drops from 80%/20% to 70%/30% or even less.  Second, 
researchers may examine how the specific distribution of teachers impacts achievement.  
Given limited budgetary resources, I might suggest that getting the right number of 
employees in the right places may have important effects.  For example, it may that 
smaller class sizes are more important in high-need elementary classrooms than in high 
school classrooms. Finally, I suggest that the lack of strong main effects of any of the 
four personnel spending indicates that Virginia’s schools are currently operating in a 
“sweet spot” based on their district’s needs, which decision makers have established over 
time.  It may be time to change the discussion away from “how can increased spending 
positively impact student achievement?” to “to what extent could decreased spending 
negatively impact student achievement?” The latter is the question posing greater concern 
for educational decision makers today, as budget crises carry unknown and potentially 
substantial risks.   
Regional Differences   
 Perhaps the largest surprise in this study was the lack of practical significance of 
personnel spending differences within regions.  While it seems like a reasonable 
assumption that teachers and others are attracted to the school division with the best pay 
and the need to compete with other districts is an often cited reason for raising salary, 
there is little evidence salary or spending relative to other divisions in a region actually 
has an impact on student achievement.  These findings do not necessarily refute those of 
Allen (2005) as the offered salaries may all still be acceptable in light of other things that 




create overall working conditions.  Ingersoll (2001) noted 47% of teachers who switch 
schools cited salary as a reason, but it may not be the only reason that is driving their 
decision to switch districts.   
 These findings open up several possibilities. First, it is possible an otherwise 
content teacher may stay where they are even if the salary is lower than that of 
neighboring districts and while salary is a factor in teacher’s decisions to switch districts, 
it is not the overriding one.  Second, it could be when a teacher leaves to go to another 
school division (due to any reason) they are replaced by equally competent teachers as 
experienced teachers are unlikely to be the ones leaving in large enough numbers to make 
a significant difference.  If this is the case it would explain how salary could influence 
retention as was asserted by Ingersoll (2001) but not impact student achievement.  If we 
assume teacher quality matters, this study indicates the best teachers do not necessarily 
gravitate towards the districts with the best pay, or if they do, interview/hiring processes 
may lack the efficiency needed to separate the best teachers from the mediocre ones.  
Third, if we accept Monk’s (2007) attractiveness theory, then we might assume that most 
districts may be cognizant of the wages being offered by their neighbors in the region and 
offer salaries that are competitive in light of the other elements that make a district 
attractive. Thus, making decisions to transfer within-region more dependent on the other 
attractiveness other attributes.   
Wealth 
 While wealth was not initially intended as a main effect variable because it lies 
outside of the control of a district’s leadership, it clearly has the largest impact on student 
achievement of any of the studied variables.  In fact, the correlation between wealth and 




student achievement when measured by composite index was equal to that of teacher 
salary.  However, when wealth is measured by either median household income or fiscal 
stress, the correlation doubles making wealth, as predicted by median household income 
or fiscal stress, by far the largest predictor of student achievement.  Unfortunately, while 
a district’s wealth has the largest impact on a child’s education the wealth of a district is 
largely outside the control of division’s leadership.   
 Composite index is currently the measurement of wealth used by the state of 
Virginia to determine the amount of state funding each school division receives.  The 
intent is for state aide to level the playing field and minimize the disadvantages 
experienced by the poorest districts relative to their wealthier counterparts.  Presently, the 
success of this is limited as the poorest districts are still spending less money per pupil 
than the state average.  While wealth is clearly the most important predictor of student 
achievement, composite index may not be effectively serving its intended purpose in 
measuring wealth and fairly distributing state funding.  Wealth, if measured by either 
median household income or fiscal stress exhibits twice the correlation with student 
achievement as it does when measured by composite index.  While a slightly lower 
correlation for composite index may be expected as it is the current formula used to level 
the playing field, the magnitude of its difference compared to median household income 
and fiscal stress indicates many students are left behind under the current funding system.  
If the goal behind the current sliding scale for the amount of state funding a district 
receives is to even the playing field, it is not successful as the least wealthy divisions 
exhibit the lowest student achievement.  Consequently, it may be time to revisit 




Virginia’s funding formula in order to ensure it is serving its intended purpose of 
providing all children with an equal opportunity for education.  
 Moderating Effects 
 These findings do not support the moderating effect of either population density 
or wealth.  However, both produced main effects on student achievement, indicating that 
divisions in rural and urban and less wealthy areas score lower on student achievement 
than divisions in suburban and wealthy divisions.  These main effects are consistent with 
prior research on population density by Greenlee & Brown (2009), Jacobs (2007), 
Jimerson (2007), and Monk (2007), who noted the disadvantages faced by rural and 
urban districts and of Charlotte Advocates for Education (2004), Clark Martorell and 
Rockoff (2009), Greenlee and Brown (2009), O’Donnell and White (2003), and Payne 
(2003, 2009) who noted the disadvantages faced by less affluent districts. 
Limitations 
 While this study takes a comprehensive look at personnel spending, it does have 
some limitations.  First, only a single measure, SOL test scores was used to measure 
student achievement.  While this is a standardized measure selected because it is the most 
important measure for Virginia’s educators, it is only a single measure and the small 
standard deviation of scores indicates most divisions have managed to attain comparable 
proficiencies.  
Second, this study measures personnel spending as it currently is and not how it 
would be impacted by changes. If educational leaders have correctly adjusted spending to 
meet the local needs of their divisions, then we could expect all divisions to get similar 
results thus not providing us with insight into what would happen if a district experienced 




either a substantive increase in spending, or what is more likely, substantive spending 
cuts.   The practical implications of this knowledge would be useful to educational 
leaders to help them advocate for level or increased funding and to help them plan 
intelligently if cuts are unavoidable. 
Future Directions 
 While teacher salary was a significant predictor of student achievement, the lack 
of significant interactions between wealth or population density and teacher salary 
indicates the need to pay teachers a higher salary does not vary based on a district’s 
wealth or population density.  Correlations within region were nearly identical to those 
across the state indicating paying higher salaries relative to the region also does not result 
in higher student achievement.  However, teacher salary is by itself, a significant 
predictor of student achievement.  Future research is needed to determine exactly how 
salary plays a role in attracting the best teachers or if it is not a large factor, as is 
suggested by the minimal slope teacher salary exhibited in Table 4, what does attract the 
best teachers to the best schools? 
 The lack of difference between within region correlations and those from across 
the state makes it possible that either the interview/hiring process lacks the effectiveness 
needed to identify the best teachers or that salary is only one element of a larger set of 
working conditions that make a person want to work in a particular division.  Further 
research on both hiring and on the importance of salary as a part of working conditions 
could help explain the reason correlations with in region were no different than those 
across the state.   




 A district’s status as “rural” was consistently found to have a negative impact on 
student achievement.  Future research is needed to determine specifically what elements 
of a division’s status as rural are having a negative impact on student achievement.  From 
there, research should focus on what kinds of programs can mitigate those effects to help 
students in rural districts perform as well as their non-rural peers. 
 This study took a fairly broad look at personnel from the perspective of finding 
the optimum mix.  Future research should examine the impact of different personnel 
allocations with in the schools.  For example, there may be an advantage in having 
elementary classes as small as 10 while high school classes of 30 may be fine.  Previous 
experimental design studies on class size that have found a positive relationship between 
class size and student achievement (Figlio, 1998, Jepson & Rivkin, 2009, Mosteller, 
1995) all either examined a narrow grade level or had potential problems caused by 
students switching between control and treatment groups.  Future research should use a 
large sample of data from divisions nationally and break down average class size per 
grade level in order to determine if smaller classes are or are not more advantageous for 
some grade levels than others. 
 Given the lack of impact found by spending inputs in this study, it is possible 
personnel costs are somewhat fixed and districts are unable to meaningfully reduce their 
current personnel costs without the perception of catastrophe.  Future research should 
examine budgets across many school systems in order to identify what costs are variable 
(based on some divisions being able to do without various line-items) and which costs are 
fixed (based on all divisions spending at comparable levels).  Once identified, the impact 




of those variable costs can be measured against student achievement to determine how 
adjusting those costs impacts student achievement. 
   Finally and most importantly, this study highlights that nothing currently in place 
is solving the problems posed by economic inequality.  Consequently, something must be 
tried and measured to remedy the fact that a district’s wealth is the largest predictor of 
student achievement.  While in a perfect world, a significant increase in state funding 
would be applied to poorer districts to see if an increase in spending could affect the 
problems posed by inequality, a more practical solution is to identify the specific 
problems caused by inequality and design specific programs to target those problems and 
measure their impact. 
Conclusion 
 As the majority of any school system’s budget is spent on personnel, this study 
examined the effects of specific personnel spending inputs on student achievement within 
the context of wealth, population density, and region.  Findings indicated the only inputs 
with a significant impact on student achievement were principal and teacher salary.  
These finding did not vary whether examined relative to a regional average or across the 
entire state indicating it is not crucial for school division leaders to outspend their 
neighbors.  Furthermore, none of the interactions between the main spending inputs and 
population density or wealth were significant indicating wealth and population density do 
not serve as moderators for the studied spending inputs.  However, a division’s status as 
rural, and to a greater extent the wealth of a district do serve as predictors of student 
achievement.  While per-pupil expenditures as an input were not correlated with student 
achievement the poorest districts are spending less than the state average making it 




unknown how additional spending could help the poorest districts overcome the effects of 
inequality.  Given the overwhelming impact a district’s wealth has on test scores, it is a 
problem state education leaders need to address.    
 The current funding formula needs to be changed in order to provide equal 
educational opportunities to students from less affluent backgrounds.  This is not 
currently the case as wealth exhibits the strongest correlation with student achievement.  
Theoretically, state funding should serve to level the playing field and offset the ill 
effects of low-wealth on student achievement.  This is not currently the case as the 
poorest districts spend less money per-pupil than the state average.  Fixing this problem 
will require our state leaders to re-think the way state funds are distributed.  The way 
wealth is measured is the place to start this conversation as median household income and 
fiscal stress exhibit twice the correlation with student achievement as composite index 
indicating many students are left behind under the current system.  A starting point for 
designing a new system may be the fiscal stress index as it indicates the amount of 
additional revenue a locality is capable of raising thus identifying districts that could 
offset a drop in state funding by raising additional money and those who lack the 
capability to raise any additional money.  By implementing  a different formula for 
determining funding, we may be able to take steps to mitigate the impact of wealth on 
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Appendix Tables 2-22 
Table 2 
Table of Descriptive Statistics 
 M SD  
Per Pupil Expenditures 1.12 .20  
Average Teacher Salary 4.82 6.43  
Average Principal Salary 8.62 1.50  
Pupil Teacher Ratio 12.12 1.51  
Pupil/Support Personnel Ratio 57.07 18.94  
Composite Index .39 .15  
Median Household Income 5.27 1.90  
Fiscal Stress 99.99 3.64  
Reading Scores .77 .07  
Math Scores .77 .07  
Note: N=132, Per pupil expenditures, average teacher salary, average principal salary, 















Table of Pearson correlations for all research variables. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Math Score             
2. Reading Score .86*  .          
3. Per Pupil Expenditures .05 .02           
4. Teacher Salary .24* .22* .50*          
5. Principal Salary .22* .16 .38* .85*         
6. Pupil/Teacher Ratio .06 .10 -.55* .29* .27*        
7. Pupil/Support Personnel Ratio .08 .05 -.38* .07 .09 .53*       
8. Urban -.02 -.08 .20* .43* .40* .14 .04      
9. Rural -.19* -.18* -.07 -.44* -.50* -.24 -.09 -.35*     
10. Composite Index .24* .21* .68* .48* .40* -.31* -.29* .07 -.12    
11. Median Household Income .40* .45* .24* .74* .75* .33* .11 .28* -.46* .48*   
12. Fiscal Stress -.46* -.50* -.37* -.49* .47* .00 .07 .08 .19* -.71* -.75*  









Simple linear regression slopes for per-pupil expenditures (PPE), average teacher salary 
(ATS), average principal salary (APS), pupil/teacher ratio (PTR) and pupil/support 
personnel ratio (PSPR). 
                Math                                Reading                              
Variable b se t p b se t p 
PPE .02 .03 .54 .59 .01 .03 .19 .85 
ATS .03 .01 2.77 .01* .02 .01 2.57 .01* 
APS .01 .00 2.67 .01* .01 .00 1.88 .06 
PTR .00 .00 .66 .51 .00 .00 1.12 .27 
PSPR .00 .00 .89 .38 .00 .00 .54 .59 































MLR Regression Results for Average Teacher Salary (ATS), Average Principal Salary (APS), Pupil/Teacher Ratio (PTR) and 
Pupil/Support Personnel Ratio (PSPR) on Math (a) and Reading (b) Scores 
                Model 1a                                Model 2a                                 Model 3a                         Model 4a   
Variable b se t p b se t p b se t p b se t p 
ATS .03 .01 2.77 .01* .02 .02 1.01 .28 .02 .02 1.01 .28 .02 .02 1.17 .24 
APS     .00 .01 .43 .67 .00 .01 .44 .66 .00 .01 .40 .69 
PTR         .00 .00 -.14 .89 .00 .01 -.60 .55 
PSPR             .00 .00 .90 .37 
R2  .06    .06    .06    .06   
F for R2 Change  7.68    .19    .02    .82   
 
 Model 1b                                Model 2b                                 Model 3b                         Model 4b   
Variable b se t p b se t p b se t p b se t p 
ATS .02 .04 2.53 .01* .03 .02 1.73 .09 .03 .02 1.67 .10 .03 .02 1.67 .09 
APS     .00 .01 -.48 .64 .00 .01 -.50 .62 .00 .01 -.50 .62 
PTR         .00 .00 .46 .65 .00 .01 .29 .77 
PSPR             .00 .00 .19 .85 
R2  .05    .05    .05    .05   
F for R2 Change  6.38    .23    .21    .04   













Table of Pearson Correlations 
 State-Wide   Within Region  
Variable Math Reading  Math Reading 
Per Pupil Expenditures .05 .01    
Average Teacher Salary .24* .22*  .21* .24* 
Average Principal Salary .22* .16  .21* .18* 
Pupil Teacher Ratio .06 .10  .01 .08 
Pupil/Support Personnel Ratio .08 .05    
Composite Index .24* .21*    
Median Household Income .40* .45*    
Fiscal Stress .46* .50*    
Rural -.19* -18*    
Urban -.02 -.08    
Note: N=132, *p<.05 
 
  

















3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PPE .02 .00 .54 .59  .02 .03 .62 .54  -.02 .05 -.29 .77 
Urban      -.02 .02 -1.19 .24  -.03 .02 -.13 .18 
Rural      -.03 .01 -2.40 .02*  -.03 .01 -.23 .02* 
Interaction Rural X PPE           .04 .08 .48 .63 
Interaction Urban X PPE           .08 .08 1.00 .32 
R2  .00     .04     .05   












3b   
Variable b se t p 
 





PPE .01 .03 .19 .85  .01 .03 .40 .69  -.04 .05 -.75 .45 
Urban      -.03 .02 1.80 .07  -.04 .02 -2.19 .03* 
Rural      -.03 .01 -2.60 .01*  -.03 .01 -2.58 .01* 
Interaction Rural X PPE           .03 .07 .46 .65 
Interaction Urban X PPE           .13 .07 1.80 .07 
R2  .00     .06*     .08   
F for R2 Change  .04     3.94*     1.71   
Note: N=132, *p<.05, PPE is expressed in units of $10,000. 
 




















3a   
Variable b Se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
Teacher Salary .03 .01 2.77 .01*  .03 .01 2.55 .01  .01 .00 .81 .42 
Urban      -.02 .01 -1.40 .16  -.02 .02 -1.17 .25 
Rural      -.04 .02 -1.90 .06  -.05 .02 -2.17 .03* 
Interaction Urban X ATS           .03 .02 1.17 .24 
Interaction Rural X ATS           .02 .03 .66 .51 
R2  .06     .09     .10   












3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
Teacher Salary .02 .01 2.53 .01*  2.67 .01 2.56 .01*  .02 .02 1.26 .21 
Urban      -.02 .01 -1.65 .10  -.03 .02 -2.04 .04* 
Rural      -.05 .02 -2.58 .01*  -.06 .02 -2.93 .00* 
Interaction Urban X ATS           .03 .02 1.11 .27 
Interaction Rural X ATS           -.02 .03 -.63 .53 
R2  .05     .10     .12   
F for R2 Change  6.38     4.00     1.20   
Note: N=132, *p<.05, ATS is expressed in units of $10,000. 





MLR Regression Results for Population Density as a Moderator of Average Principal Salary (APS) on Math (a) and Reading 
(b) Scores 
  Model 1a     Model 2a     Model 3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
Average Principal Salary .01 .00 2.57 .01*  .01 .01 2.11 .04*  .01 .01 1.12 .26 
Urban      -.32 .02 -1.64 .10  -.04 .02 -1.63 .11 
Rural      -.02 .02 -1.31 .19  -.02 .02 -1.26 .21 
Inter. Urban X APS           .01 .01 .42 .67 
Inter. Rural X APS           .00 .01 .06 .95 
R2  .05     .08     .08   
F for R2 Change  6.62     1.87     .01   
 
  Model 1b     Model 2b     Model 3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
Average Principal Salary .01 .00 1.88 .06  .01 .01 1.50 .14  .01 .01 1.39 .17 
Urban      -.04 .02 -2.14 .03*  -.05 .02 -2.27 .03* 
Rural      -.02 .01 -1.76 .08  -.04 .02 -2.42 .02* 
Inter. Urban X APS           .00 .01 .35 .73 
Inter. Rural X APS           -.02 .01 -1.54 .13 
R2  .03     .07     .10   
F for R2 Change  3.51     3.26     1.72   











MLR Regression Results for Population Density as a Moderator of Pupil/Teacher Ratio (PTR) on Math (a) and Reading (b) 
Scores 
  Model 1a     Model 2a     Model 3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PTR .00 .00 .66 .51  .00 .00 .24 .81  .00 .01 .11 .91 
Urban      -.02 .02 -1.10 .27  -.02 .02 -1.12 .27 
Rural      .03 .01 -2.30 .02*  -.03 .01 -2.28 .03* 
Interaction Rural X PTR           .00 .01 .25 .81 
Interaction Urban X PTR           .00 .01 -.03 .98 
R2  .00     .44     .44   
F for R2 Change  .44     2.77     .04   
 
  Model 1b     Model 2b     Model 3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PTR .00 .00 1.12 .27  .00 .00 .77 .44  .01 .01 .99 .33 
Urban      -.03 .02 -1.84 .07  -.03 .02 -1.55 .12 
Rural      -.03 .01 -2.42 .02*  -.03 .01 -2.39 .02* 
Interaction Rural X PTR           -.01 .01 -.66 .51 
Interaction Urban X PTR           -.00 .01 -.42 .68 
R2  .01     .06     .07   
F for R2 Change  1.25     3.55     .25   










MLR Regression Results for Composite Index (CI) as a Moderator of Per-Pupil Expenditure (PPE) on Math (a) and Reading 
(b) Scores 
  Model 1a     Model 2a     Model 3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PPE .02 .03 .54 .59  -.08 .04 -1.86 .07  -.12 .05 1.40 .03* 
Composite Index      .19 .06 3.35 .00*  .17 .06 3.04 .00* 
Interaction  CI X PPE           .19 .16 -1.52 .25 
R2  .00     .08     .09   
F for R2 Change  .29  .59   11.25*  .00*   1.35  .14 
 
  Model 1b     Model 2b     Model 3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PPE .01 .03 .19 .85  -.08 .04 -1.99 .05*  -.13 .05 -2.74 .02* 
Composite Index      .16 .05 3.15 .00*  .14 .05 2.70 .01* 
Interaction  CI X PPE           .28 .15 1.88 .06 
R2  .00     .07     .10   
F for R2 Change  .04     9.94*     3.55   











MLR Regression Results for Median Household Income as a Moderator of Per-Pupil Expenditure on Math (a) and Reading (b) 
Scores 
  Model 1a     Model 2a     Model 3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PPE .02 .03 .54 .59  -.02 .03 -.63 .53  -.02 .03 -.49 .62 
Median Household Income      -.02 .00 4.92 .00*  .02 .00 4.65 .00* 
Interaction  MHI X PPE           -3.37 .01 -.31 .76 
R2  .00     .16     .16   
F for R2 Change  .29     24.23     .06   
 
  Model 1b     Model 2b     Model 3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PPE .01 .03 .19 .85 
 





MHI      .02 .00 5.20 .00*  .02 .00 5.20 .00* 
Interaction  MHI X PPE           .01 .01 .59 .55 
R2  .00     .21     .21   
F for R2 Change  .04     35.65     .35   












MLR Regression Results for Fiscal Stress as a Moderator of Per-Pupil Expenditure on Math (a) and Reading (b) Score. 
  
Model 








3   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PPE .02 .03 .54 .59  -.05 .03 -1.68 .10  .22 .62 .35 .73 
Fiscal Stress      -.01 .00 -6.12 .00*  -.01 .00 -5.68 .00* 
Int.  Fiscal Stress X PPE           .00 .01 -.43 .67 
R2  .00     .23     .29   












3   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PPE .01 .03 .19 .85  -.06 .03 -2.37 .02*  -.07 .55 1.25 .21 
Fiscal Stress      -.01 .00 -7.05 .00*  -.01 .00 -6.31 .00* 
Int.  Fiscal Stress X PPE           -.01 .01 -1.37 .17  
R2  .00     .28     .29   
F for R2 Change  .04     49.65     1.89   














1a   
 




3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
Average Teacher Salary .03 .01 2.77 .01*  .02 .01 1.62 .12  .03 .00 1.88 .06 
Composite Index      .08 .05 1.70 .09  .09 .05 1.85 .07 
Int.  CI X ATS           -.05 .05 -.97 .34 
R2  .06     .08     .08   












3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b Se t p 
Average Teacher Salary .02 .01 2.53 .01*  .02 .01 1.55 .12  .01 .01 1.13 .26 
Composite Index      .06 .04 1.39 .17  .06 .04 1.25 .22 
Int.  CI X Teach. Salary           .02 .04 .56 .58 
R2  .05     .06     .07   
F for R2 Change  6.38     1.92     .88   










MLR Regression Results for Median Household Income (MHI) as a Moderator of Average Teacher Salary on Math (a) and 
Reading (b) Scores 
  Model 1a     Model 2a     Model 3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
Average Teacher Salary .03 .01 2.77 .01*  -.02 .01 1.08 .28  .01 .02 -.68 .50 
MHI      .02 .01 4.10 .00*  .02 .01 4.25 .00* 
Int.  MHI X ATS           .00 .00 -1.11 .27 
R2  .06     .17     .17   
F for R2 Change  7.68     16.86     1.11   
  
  Model 1b     Model 2b     Model 3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b Se t p 
Average Teacher Salary .02 .01 2.53 .01*  -.03 .01 -2.28 .02*  -.03 .01 -2.10 .04* 
MHI      .02 .00 5.61 .00*  .02 .00 5.39 .00* 
Int.  MHI X ATS           .00 .00 -.14 .89 
R2  .05     .23     .23   
F for R2 Change  6.38     31.48     .01   











MLR Regression Results for Fiscal Stress (FS) as a Moderator of Average Teacher Salary (TS) on Math (a) and Reading (b) 
Scores 
  Model 1a     Model 2a     Model 3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
Average Teacher Salary .03 .01 2.77 .01*  .00 .01 .18 .86  -.02 .19 -1.07 .29 
Fiscal Stress      -.01 .00 -5.02 .00*  -.01 .00 -5.14 .00* 
Int.  FS X TS           .00 .00 1.08 .28 
R2  .06     .21     .22   
F for R2 Change  7.68     25.23     1.16   
 
  Model 1b     Model 2b     Model 3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
Average Teacher Salary .02 .01 2.53 .01*  .00 .01 -3.90 .69  .04 .17 .25 .81 
Fiscal Stress      -.01 .00 -5.87 .00*  -.01 .00 -5.72 .00* 
Int.  FS X TS           .00 .00 -.27 .79 
R2  .05     .25     .25   
F for R2 Change  6.38     34.43     .07   











MLR Regression Results for Composite Index (CI) as a Moderator of Average Principal Salary (APS) on Math (a) and 
Reading (b) Scores 
  Model 1a     Model 2a     Model 3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
Average Principal Salary .01 .00 2.57 .01*  .01 .01 1.59 .11  .01 .01 2.00 .05* 
Composite Index      .09 .05 1.95 .05*  .01 .05 2.11 .04* 
Int.  CI X APS           -.03 .02 -1.42 .16 
R2  .05     .08     .09   
F for R2 Change  6.62     3.81     2.00   
 
  Model 1b     Model 2b     Model 3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
Average Principal Salary .01 .00 1.88 .06  .00 .00 .09 .32  .00 .01 .81 .42 
Composite Index      .08 .04 .17 .07  .07 .04 1.77 .08 
Int.  CI X APS           .01 .02 .31 .76 
R2  .03     .05     .05   
F for R2 Change  3.52     3.31     .10   











MLR Regression Results for Median Household Income (MHI) as a Moderator of Average Principal Salary (APS) on Math (a) 
and Reading (b) Scores 








3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
APS .01 .00 2.57 .01*  -.01 .01 -1.47 .15  -.01 .01 -1.18 .26 
MHI      .02 .01 4.37 .00*  .02 .01 4.50 .00* 
Int.  MHI X APS           -.00 .00 -1.12 .26 
R2  .05   
 
 .17   
 
 .18   
F for R2 Change  6.62     19.11     1.26   
 
  Model 1b     Model 2b     Model 3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
APS .01 .00 1.88 .06  -.01 .01 -3.55 .00*  -.02 .01 -3.47 .00* 
MHI      .02 .00 6.63 .00*  .03 .00 6.20 .00* 
Int.  MHI X APS           .00 .00 .11 .91 
R2  .03     .27     .27   
F for R2 Change  3.51     43.94     .01   










MLR Regression Results for Fiscal Stress (FS) as a Moderator of Average Principal Salary (APS) on Math (a) and Reading 
(b) Scores 
  Model 1a     Model 2a     Model 3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
APS .01 .00 2.57 .01*  .00 .00 .04 .97  -.08 .03 -1.03 .31 
Fiscal Stress      -.01 .00 -5.14 .00*  -.01 .00 -5.23 .00* 
Int.  FS X APS           .00 .00 1.03 .30 
R2  .05     .21     .22   
F for R2 Change  6.62     26.39     1.07   
 
  Model 1b     Model 2b     Model 3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
APS .01 .00 1.88 .06  .00 .00 -1.10 .28  .05 .07 .77 .44 
Fiscal Stress      0.01 .00 -6.27 .00*  -.01 .00 -6.11 .00* 
Int.  FS X APS           .00 .00 -.84 .40 
R2  .03     .25     .26   
F for R2 Change  3.51     39.30     .70   

















MLR Regression Results for Composite Index (CI) as a Moderator of Pupil/Teacher Ratio (PTR) on Math (a) and Reading (b) 
Scores 
  Model 1a     Model 2a     Model 3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PTR .00 .00 .66 .51  .01 .00 1.65 .10  .01 .00 1.58 .12 
Composite Index      .14 .04 3.21 .00*  .14 .05 2.79 .01* 
Int.  CI X PTR           .00 .03 .13 .90 
R2  .00     .08     .08   
F for R2 Change  .44     10.30     .09   
 
  Model 1b     Model 2b     Model 3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PTR .00 .00 1.12 .27  .01 .00 2.00 .05*  .01 .00 1.83 .07 
Composite Index      .12 .04 2.96 .00*  .13 .05 2.88 .01* 
Int.  CI X PTR           .02 .02 .69 .50 
R2  .01     .07     .07   
F for R2 Change  1.25     8.76     .11   











MLR Regression Results for Median Household Income (MHI) as a Moderator of Pupil/Teacher Ratio (PTR) on Math (a) and 
Reading (b) Scores 
  Model 1a     Model 2a     Model 3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PTR .00 .00 .66 .51  .00 .00 -.95 .34  .00 .00 -.83 .39 
MHI      .02 .00 4.97 .00*  .02 .00 4.97 .00* 
Int.  MHI X PTR           .00 .00 -.43 .67 
R2  .00     .16     .16   
F for R2 Change  .44     24.65     .19   
 
  Model 1b     Model 2b     Model 3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PTR .00 .00 1.12 .27  .00 .00 -.54 .59  .00 .00 -.50 .62 
MHI      .02 .00 5.64 .00*  .02 .00 5.67 .00* 
Int.  MHI X PTR           .00 .00 -.74 .46 
R2  .01     .21     .21   
F for R2 Change  1.25     31.86     .55   












MLR Regression Results for Fiscal Stress (FS) as a Moderator of Pupil/Teacher Ratio (PTR) on Math (a) and Reading (b) 
Scores 
  Model 1a     Model 2a     Model 3a   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t p 
PTR .00 .00 .66 .51  .00 .00 .76 .45  .03 .12 .25 .80 
Fiscal Stress      0.01 .00 -.46 .00*  -.01 .00 -5.62 .00* 
Int.  FS X PTR           .00 .00 -23 .82 
R2  .00     .21     .21   
F for R2 Change  .44     34.48     .05   
 
  Model 1b     Model 2b     Model 3b   
Variable b se t p  b se t p  b se t P 
PTR .00 .00 1.12 .27  .00 .00 1.30 .59  .06 .10 .54 .59 
Fiscal Stress      0.01 .00 -6.55 .00*  -.01 .00 -6.35 .00* 
Int.  FS X PTR           -.00 .00 -.49 .62 
R2  .01     .26     .26   
F for R2 Change  1.25     42.85     .24   
Note: N=132, *p<.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
